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The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was fought over 
competing claims to sovereignty over a group of islands off 
the east coast of South America. The dispute was between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina claims the 
islands under rights to Spanish succession, the fact that 
they lie off the Argentine coast line and that in 1833 
Great Britain took the islands illegally and by force. The 
United Kingdom claims the islands primarily through 
prescription--the fact that they have governed the islands 
in a peaceful, continuous and public manner since 1833. The 
British also hold that the population living on the islands, 
roughly eighteen hundred British descendants, should be able 
to decide their own future. The United Kingdom also lays 
claim to the islands through rights of discovery and 
settlement, although this claim has always been challenged 
by Spain who until 1811 governed the islands. Both claims 
have legal support, and the final decision if there will 
ever be one is difficult to predict. Sadly today the 
ultimate test of sovereignty does not come through 
international law but remains in the idea that "He is 
sovereign who can defend his sovereignty." 
The years preceding the Argentine invasion of 1982 
witnessed many diplomatic exchanges between The United 
Kingdom and Argentina over the future of the islands. 
During this time the British sent signals to Argentina that 
ii 
implied a decline in British resolve to hold the islands and 
demonstrated that military action did more to further the 
talks along than did actual negotiations. The Argentine 
military junta read these signals and decided that they 
could take the islands in a quick military invasion and that 
the United Kingdom would consider the act as a fait accompli 
and would not protest the invasion. The British in response 
to this claimed that they never signaled to Argentina that a 
military solution was acceptable to them and launched a 
Royal Navy task force to liberate the islands. Both 
governments responded to an international crisis with means 
that were designed both to resolve the international crisis and 
increase the domestic popularity of the government. British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing an all-time low 
in popularity for post-War Prime Ministers while Argentine 
President General Galtieri needed to gain mass popular 
support so he could remain a viable President after he was 
scheduled to lose command of the army and a seat on the 
military junta that ran the country. 
The military war for the Falklands is indicative of the 
nature of modern warfare between Third World countries. It 
shows that the gap in military capabilities between Third 
and First World countries is narrowing significantly. 
Modern warfare between a First and Third World country is no 
longer a 'walk over' for the First World country. 
iii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Falkland Islands 1 are situated in the South 
Atlantic and are about four hundred and eighty miles north-
east of Cape Horn, three hundred miles from the nearest 
point on the South American mainland and about eight 
thousand miles from London. They consist of roughly two 
hundred islands the largest of which are West and East 
Falkland. Their total land mass is approximately four 
thousand seven hundred square miles. They are populated by 
roughly one thousand eight hundred British citizens. The 
terrain is mainly barren grasslands and hills, the highest 
of which is Mount Osborne which rises two thousand three 
hundred and twelve feet. The climate is harsh with average 
temperatures between twenty degrees Celsius and minus five 
degrees Celsius. The islands are wind swept and overcast, 
and snow has been reported in every month except for Feb-
ruary. Given these physical characteristics why did ten 
thousand Argentine troops invade these islands on 2 April 
1982, why did the British Government spend over b2 billion2 
1. The islands are known as the Malvinas in Argentina. 
Although the use of either generally indicates support for 
one side over the other I have decided to use only the 
English name for the islands except in quotations from 
Argentine sources where it seemed inappropriate to use the 
name Falklands. The individual use of the name Falklands 
was chosen because the use of both names, separated either 
by a slash or parentheses, seemed to detract from the flow 
of the writing; no political implication should be deduced. 
2 
to recapture these islands and more importantly why did 
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roughly twelve hundred men have to die during the conflict? 
The islands have no modern strategic value, the only indus-
try is sheep farming, they have a small population of about 
eighteen hundred, and were virtually unknown to the average 
British citizen let alone the rest of the world prior to the 
April invasion. 
The Falkland Islands have been a long standing source 
of tensions between The United Kingdom and Argentina. The 
War of 1982 was initiated by the Argentine junta in order to 
focus public attention away from domestic political develop-
ments in Argentina. The British responded to the inter-
national crisis in a manner that would show the world, and 
the British public, that even though the Empire was no 
longer, Britain was still a world power and was willing to 
use force to retain her remaining world possessions. This 
crisis demonstrates the modern nature of conflict and war 
fare between the industrial and developing states. 
The methodology used in this thesis will be to divide 
the analysis into three areas, legal considerations, bilat-
eral signaling and domestic politics, and a strategic over-
view. The first chapter will deal with the legal aspects 
2. An unofficial estimate which includes the cost of 
sending the task force and replacement cost of the equipment 
and ships lost. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle 
for the Falklands (London: Pan books, 1983), 317. 
3. This total is an estimate based on reported 
casualties and losses on both sides. 
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and will include the international law governing the area 
and an analysis of the two conflicting claims on the islands 
and their dependencies. It will also deal with the legality 
of intervention and the use of force in international rela-
tions. Finally, an examination of why inter national law 
failed to resolve the dispute will be under taken. 
Chapter two will examine the decision making process of 
both governments and the role domestic politics played 
throughout the crisis. The key political decisions by both 
parties, from the initial Argentine use of military force to 
capture the islands to the British deployment of a task 
force and its subsequent retaking of the colony, all reflect 
domestic political considerations. The role of inter-
national signalling will also be examined to find if either 
side was sending or receiving false signals from the other 
country. 
Chapter three will be an overview of the strategic 
aspects of the crisis. The nature of conflicts between the 
industrial and developing countries will be examined, as 
well the nature of modern Third World warfare. Eliot 
Cohen's article, "Distant Battles", offers a particularly 
pertinent method to the study of modern Third World warfare. 
The nature of strategy, operations, tactics and logistics in 
modern Third World conflicts will be examined as to their 
relationship to the Falkland Islands War. 
The literature on the Falklands War is both voluminous 
and quite good. Immediately following the conflict many 
instant histories were produced by the journalists who 
covered the war. Most of these deal primarily with life on 
the task force as it sailed to the South Atlantic or life 
with the Royal Marines or Para regiments that fought the 
war. Most of these only give a brief outline of the con-
flict or the political factors that led to the conflict. 
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The best of these dealt with a little more than the daily 
life of the combatants. These included Max Hastings and 
Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands and Paul Eddy 
and Magnus Linklater with the Sunday Times Insight Team, The 
Falklands War. Most of the articles and books that have 
been written on the conflict deal with a singular aspect of 
the conflict and do not attempt to tie in any of the dif-
ferent aspects of the entire crisis. One collection that 
attempts this however was The Falklands War: Lessons for 
Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law, edited by 
Alberto R. ColI and Anthony C Arend. The Struggle for the 
Falkland Islands by Julius Goebel Jr. is the definitive book 
concerning the sovereignty dispute. It was first published 
in 1927 and subsequently reprinted in 1982. The British 
government commissioned Lord Franks to conduct a Privy Coun-
cil investigation into the origins of the dispute and the 
published findings of that investigation is the best source 
for the history of the diplomatic and historic dispute bet-
ween the two countries between the 1960's and 1982. 
Finally, Eliot Cohen's article "Distant Battles," in Inter-
national Security Spring 1986 does a singularly excellent 
job in outlining the nature of modern Third World warfare 
and how the Falklands War demonstrated most of the charac-
teristics that affect the nature of warfare between indus-
trialized and developing states. 
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The Falkland Islands War of 1982 in many ways is a 
throw back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century warfare. 
It was a war fought more for colonial interests than reasons 
of global peace and security and it was perhaps The United 
Kingdom's last colonial war. For Argentina the war offered 
a diversion from domestic problems and chance to increase 
Argentine prestige in Latin America and the Third World. 
International conflicts and wars cannot be studied 
without reference to their individual parts. International 
law, diplomacy and strategic policy all need to be examined 
in order to gain a complete understanding of the conflict. 
These three elements are interrelated as a state's strategic 
and military preparations are determined by that state's 
foreign policy and diplomacy. These in turn, are affected 
by international law. 
Diplomacy is a product of a state's strategic interests 
and capabilities. Diplomacy is also a foundation of inter-
national law, therefore international law is a product of 
the sum of the strategic concerns of all states. 
In any dispute a state will use international law to 
justify its position. Moreover, the state will shape its 
foreign and strategic policy around its legal position. 
This is not only done when a state finds that it has inter-
6 
national law in support of its claims but also when it finds 
that its foreign policy is in violation of international 
law. In this case a state will shape its diplomatic activi-
ties away from international law and emphasize other aspects 
that puts a more favourable light on its actions. The state 
will also develop a strategic policy that supports its for-
eign policy. If a state is advocating a pacifist foreign 
policy then having a large military engaging in offensive 
exercises grants little validity to its foreign policy. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LEGAL ASPECTS 
Legality of Territorial Claims 
Who has legal right to the islands? This question 
seemed cut and dried to the two opposing governments. Both 
made repeated claims that they were acting in accordance to 
international law. Prime Minister Thatcher, in a speech to 
the House of Commons on April 3, 1982, stated, "We have 
absolutely no doubt about our sovereignty, which has been 
continuous since 1833 . .,1 The Government of Argentina 
claimed that, "the simple geographical, historical and legal 
truths, without any exaggeration, constitute the best de-
fence of our rights of sovereignty over the three Southern 
archipelagos. ,,2 Determining who has legal rights over these 
islands is more complicated than either government has 
claimed. 
General Principles of Sovereignty Rights 
1. The Falklands Campaign: a Digest of Debates in the 
House of Commons 2 April to 15 June 1982 (Commons), 5. 
2. Rear Admiral (RS) Laurio H. Destefani, The 
Malvinas, The South Georgias and The South Sandwich Islands, 
the conflict with Britain, trans. Martha Heath and Ruth 
James (Buenos Aires: Edipress S.A., 1982),4. This book was 
supplied by the Embassy of Argentina to Canada in response 
to my request on information stating their claims to the 
islands. 
8 
The legal question to be answered is, who has the 
sovereign territorial rights to the Falkland Islands? 
Territorial sovereignty refers to the right and ability of a 
state to enforce its authority over a given area to the 
exclusion of all others. 3 This sovereignty can be gained 
through five actions; accretion, whereby the forces of 
nature change the geography of a territory; cession, where 
sovereignty is transferred via treaties; prescription, 
whereby title to a territory is transferred to another state 
when the initial title holder is itself possessed and con-
trolled by that state; occupation, that is the occupation of 
previously unoccupied territory; and finally subjugation or 
forced cession of territory .4 
Another method of gaining sovereignty rights over a 
territory is by discovery. This right has fallen out of 
favour today, primarily because there is no new territory to 
discover. The simple process of discovery was not the sole 
determinant of sovereignty rights though, as explained by 
Vattel, who in an eighteenth century treatise Law of 
Nations, stated that: 
navigators going on voyages of discoveries 
furnished with a commission from their sovereign 
and meeting with islands or other lands in a 
desert state have taken possession of them in the 
name of the nation; and this title has been 
usually respected, provided it was soon after 
3. Jeffrey D. Myhre, "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas 
Under International Law," Millennium 12 (Spring 1983): 25. 
4. R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in 
International Law (New York: Oceana, 1963), 6. 
followed by a real possession. 5 
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This is manifest in the principle that any claim on a 
territory, based solely on discovery rights, cannot take 
precedence over a long standing exertion of authority over 
h Ot 6 t e terrJ. ory. Clearly no claim that comes from a ship 
passing by a territory can overrule one that comes from a 
government that has supported settlements on the territory 
and has contributed to its development and security. There 
fore it can be argued that the process of mere discovery 
offers no claim to sovereignty rights unless this discovery 
is followed very soon afterwards by establishing settlements 
on the territory. 
General Principles of Self-Determination 
The principle of self-determination has, since the 
formation of the United Nations (UN), developed into a basis 
for sovereignty rights over a territory as well. The United 
Nations' General Assembly passed resolution 1514 (XV) in 
1960 which established two principles needed to end a col-
onial domination over a territory. The first principle was 
that all people have the right to self-determination and 
have the right to determine their own system of government 
and govern their own economic, social and cultural develop-
5. Vattel Law of Nations. vol. I London, 1758. quoted 
from Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), 263. 
6. Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International 
Law, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), 200. 
ment. The second was that any attempt to challenge the 
national unity or territorial sovereignty of a state is 
incompatible with the general principles of the United 
Nations' Charter. 7 The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
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also gives the people of a territory the right to choose the 
establishment of a sovereign state, the free association or 
integration with another sovereign state, or the emergence 
into any other political status as freely decided by the 
people. This clearly grants any independent people the 
right to remain in a colonial position if that is what they 
d . 8 eSlre. 
R.Y. Jennings in The Acquisition of Territory in 
International Law describes the principle of advocating 
self-determination for sovereignty claims as the most 
recognized principle today. He suggests that this prin-
ciple, although it has legal overtones, is primarily a 
political instrument. Jennings claims that self-deter-
mination cannot be a legal doctrine because it is not 
capable of creating a sufficiently exact definition in 
relation to singular situations. The principles of self-
determination may in fact work against historical and geo-
graphical situations. 9 These principles may not be based 
7. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) quoted in, 
Alfredo Brundo Bologna, "Argentinian Claims to the Malvinas 
Under International Law." Millennium. 12 Spring (1983): 39. 
8. Thomas M. Franck, "Dulce et decorum est: the 
Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands war," 
American Journal of International Law 77 (January 
1983): 116. 
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fully upon legal principles, but this does not reduce their 
importance. In these situations plebiscites are often 
called for as an effective method by which people can decide 
their own fate. But one must then decide exactly who com-
prise 'the people' and address the further problem of his-
torical and geographical considerations which may run con-
trary to popular wishes. 
The crux of the self-determination debate centers 
around who constitutes a people or a 'self'. An internal 
definition of the self would be similar to the definition of 
a republican state: that of having the right to choose 
political association, religion, ideology occupation, eco-
nomic structures, etc. On the other hand, an external 
definition of the self would focus around the national 
sovereignty. The self, it is argued, must be free from all 
f " d ' t' 10 ore~gn om~na ~on. The self must also be a social entity 
that can claim a common heritage on a territory. This is 
true even if that society has been removed from the ter-
ritory by force and replaced by another community.ll What 
then is the proper definition of the self and does the 
history of the development of the inhabitants of a territory 
affect a proper definition of the legal owners of a ter-
ritory? 
9. Jennings, 78. 
10. Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute Over 
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 38. 
11. Christopher Bluth, "The British Resort to Force in 
12 
Claims to the Islands 
History of Discovery and Settlement 
The two conflicting claims must be examined in detail, 
to establish both who holds legal title and who comprise the 
true inhabitants of the islands. In addition, these claims 
must be presented in light of historic facts regarding the 
initial discovery of the islands and all settlements estab-
lished on the islands. This account of the history of the 
islands is not intended to support either claim but to set 
out the noteworthy events that are referred to in both 
claims. 
Who was the first to discover the Falkland Islands? 
This discovery is in dispute as the Spanish, French, Dutch, 
Portuguese and English all have made claims of discovery. 12 
The most respected claims come from a Dutchman, de Weerdt in 
1598. 13 The first undisputed landing was made by Britain's 
John Strong in 1698. In 1701, Gouin de Beauchene, a French-
man landed on the islands. 14 
the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 
24 (March 1987): 9. 
12. Brian, M. Mueller, "The Falkland Islands: Will the 
Real Owner Please Stand Up," Notre Dame Law Review 58 
(February 1983): 616-17. A detailed account of the various 
discovery claims can be found in Julius Goebel Jr., The 
Struggle for the Falkland Islands (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1927), 1-119. 
13. "Sovereignty: the Secret Doubts," The Sunday Times, 
20 June 1982, A20. 
In 1764 Louis de Bougainville of France established a 
small settlement at Port Louis on the eastern island and 
claimed the territory for the King of France. This was the 
only settlement until early the next year, when British 
Commodore John Byron surveyed the western island and pro-
claimed British sovereignty over the islands at Port Egmont 
on Saunders island, just off the northwest coast of West 
Falkland. Byron landed on the island and reportedly estab-
lished some form of settlement, but he abandoned it later 
that same year. In the following year John MacBride estab-
lished a permanent but secret British settlement at Port 
Egmont. 15 
Upon discovering that the French had established a 
settlement on the islands the Spanish sent a protest to the 
French King and demanded that the French withdraw their 
settlement and support the Spanish claim to the islands. 
The Spanish based their claim to the island under the Bulls 
of Pope Alexander VI, who in 1493 gave Spain title to all 
discovered land in the western half of the world. 16 The 
negotiations between the French and Spanish did not last 
long and the French agreed to sell their facilities on the 
13 
islands and to cede their sovereignty claims to the Spanish. 
14. Myhre, 29. 
15. Adrian F.J. Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization 
of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands," Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 6 (Spring 1983): 
403. 
16. Myhre, 29. 
On April 1, 1767, the first Spanish governor of the islands 
was appointed, Felipe Ruiz puente. 17 
The Spanish and British settlements existed in peace 
14 
for four years until the discovery of the British settlement 
by a Spanish schooner surveying the islands. The Spanish 
vessel met with a British frigate commanded by Captain Hunt 
who ordered the Spanish to leave British waters. The 
incident started a major diplomatic flurry and both govern-
ments called upon the other to quit the islands. The Span-
ish first attempted to remove the British in February of 
1770 when they dispatched two frigates into the bay at Port 
Egmont. The Spanish forces were outgunned and retired to 
Port Soledad (formerly the French Port Louis). The Spanish 
government then stationed five frigates at Port Soledad and 
in June 1770 succeeded in the removal of the British from 
Saunders island. The tensions that arose from this action 
were only lessened when the Spanish King agreed to return 
the port to the British on the condition that they did not 
press their sovereignty claim. Three years after the 
incident the British left the islands on their own accord. 
The British denied that they were in reality fulfilling a 
secret article of the agreement made with the Spanish King 
in 1771 in which the British were allowed to return to the 
islands on the condition that they would soon afterwards 
leave peacefuly. The British claimed that reasons of 
17. Ibid. 
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economics were forcing their return to England and that they 
still claimed sovereignty rights over the islands. In fact, 
the departing British Commander S.W. Clayton left a plaque 
on the blockhouse which stated that the British in no way 
were changing their claim on the islands. 18 
After the departure of the British, in 1774, the 
Spanish continued their settlement at Port Soledad until 
1811. The Napoleonic wars forced Spain to consolidate its 
resources, so the islands were abandoned. Upon The United 
Provinces' (Argentina) independence from Spain in 1816 they 
claimed the islands for themselves, but it was not until 
1820 that Colonel Daniel Jewitt, commander of an Argentinian 
naval vessel, arrived at Port Soledad and informed the 
fishermen currently occupying the island that it was Argen-
tine territory and then sailed away. The islands had no 
further contact with the Argentine government until 1828 
when Louis Vernet was granted a package of concession rights 
and established a settlement at Port Soledad. 19 
In November of 1831 Vernet seized several American 
ships on the charge that they did not comply with the 
islands' fishing laws. The Americans responded by sending 
the warship USS Lexington. The Lexington, after waiting for 
the Argentine government's reaction to its demands for 
retribution, entered Port Soledad and captured the entire 
18. Slightly conflicting accounts of these actions can 
be found in Myhre, 29-31. and Hope, 404-406. 
19. Mueller, 619. 
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settlement of eighteen inhabitants. The Americans then 
spiked the cannons and left the Port virtually destroyed. 
The Argentinians attempted to resettle the islands in 
December 1832 but were met, soon after their arrival, by the 
British corvette HMS Clio. The Clio's crew removed the 
Argentine flag, hoisted the Union Jack, and established a 
naval base on the islands. In the following January the 
British formally reestablished a settlement on the islands 
and have since continuously governed the Falkland Islands. 20 
The matter, however, was not put to rest and has been the 
major area of contention between Argentina and The United 
Kingdom. 
Argentina's Claims 
Just what are the Argentine claims to the territory? 
Argentina's commitment to reclaim the islands is based on 
the government's beliefs that the islands were illegally 
taken from them by force in 1832. This position is docu-
mented in numerous books and pamphlets distributed through 
out Latin America. Their claim to the islands has been a 
strong political tool for increased nationalism and has been 
used by every prominent Argentine political leader across 
the political spectrum. 21 The dispute has been a convenient 
20. Ibid., 622. 
21. "The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, 
Consequences, Documentation," Department of state Bulletin, 
82 (October 1982): 78. 
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method, for the various governments, of diverting public 
attention away from domestic problems in Argentina. 
The initial disputes over sovereignty were between the 
French, British and Spanish. Since Argentina had been a 
Spanish colony herself, the government believes that it has 
inherited the Spanish claim to the islands. The Argentine 
government reiterated its claim over the territorial rights 
to the islands by its decree on June 10, 1829 when it named 
Louis Vernet as political and military commander of the 
Falklands and adjacent islands. Argentina claimed the 
sovereign rights to the islands at that time because of: "1) 
the right of first occupation 2) consent to possession by 
the major European powers 3) the adjacency of the islands to 
22 the mainland and 4) the succession of all Spanish laws. 
Furthermore in Argentina's protest of 1833 to the 
British government the Argentinians stated that the Spanish 
titles to the islands were justified because of formal 
occupation since 1767, the cession or abandonment of them by 
Great Britain, the British non-activity on the islands 
during the Spanish occupation and the United Provinces' 
succession from Spain and the subsequent inheritance of all 
. ht . 1 h ld b th S . h ' . I' t 23 r1g s prevlous y eye panls lmperla 1S s. 
The doctrine of continuity, in regards to the contin-
ental shelf, also supports the Argentine claim to the 
22. Bologna, 40. 
23. Ibid., 40-41. 
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islands. This doctrine assures the state that occupies a 
territory that it has legal rights over a neighbouring 
territory and that it cannot be forced by any other state to 
occupy that territory. In the Falklands case, the French in 
1766, upon their surrender of Port Louis to the Spanish, 
stated that Spain reclaimed the islands as a dependency of 
the South American continent. Further to this in the 10 
June 1829 decree, Argentina claimed the islands on the 
grounds of the adjacency to the continent and territory of 
the Argentine government on which the islands were depen-
dent. 24 The United Kingdom, in response, claimed that 
this argument is based on a total misconception of legal 
rights over continental shelves. Legal rights over areas of 
the continental shelf are derived from the sovereignty 
rights of the territory adjacent to those areas. Therefore, 
both Argentina and the Falklands have their own continental 
25 
shelves. 
Of all of the various justifications for Argentina's 
claims there are two that have a much stronger basis than 
the others. Argentina claims succession to the Spanish 
titles according to the principles of uti possidetis. This 
principle states that the Latin American states succeeded to 
Spanish territorial boundaries after the Spaniards left 
their colonies. Although this proved to be a problem with 
24. Ibid., 44. 
25. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Falkland 
Islands: The Facts, 1982, 4-5. 
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internal Latin American boundaries (because of ill-defined 
boundary lines) it was not so in the Falklands case. The 
islands were governed by an administration that reported to 
, 1 f h' 1 'B A' 26 the v~ceroya ty 0 t e R1ver Pate 1n uenos 1res. 
Therefore it is only logical to expect that the new govern-
ment in Buenos Aires would have the sovereign rights to the 
islands. The British counter argument to this is that the 
viceroyalty of the River Plate also governed most of the 
territory of modern Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. 27 
Therefore, because Argentina has not protested the occu-
pation of this other territory, it has acquiesced its claims 
of sovereignty on the territory. 
Secondly, after the Spanish governor left in 1811, this 
act could be interpreted as a demonstration of the Spanish 
desire to abandon its rights to the island. With this act 
the islands became terra nullius. The Argentine government 
followed the international law requirements of claiming its 
sovereignty in 1816 and supported this claim in 1820 when it 
sent Colonel Jewitt to take possession of the islands. In 
addition to this the Spanish government did nothing to 
protest the Argentine move thereby demonstrating its acqui-
28 
escence. 
26. Bluth, 7. 
27. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1~e Falkland 
l"slands: The Facts, 1982, 4. 
28. Bluth, 7-8. and Hope, 418-19. 
20 
British Claims 
As for the British, they can present a strong case for 
the sovereignty rights over the islands as well. The 
British government has modified its position regarding its 
claim since 1833. In 1833 when the British re-settled the 
islands, they did so based upon pre-existing rights of 
sovereignty. These pre-existing rights of sovereignty were 
based upon discovery claims (i.e. Davis in 1592) and 
subsequent occupation of the islands from 1766 to 1774, and 
on the fact that the settlement had received restoration 
payments from the King of Spain after the dispute in 1771. 
The British also pointed out that although they had left the 
islands in 1774, signs of possession were left on Saunders 
island including a plaque that expressed the British claim 
t . 29 o sovere~gnty. Lord Palmerson in a note to the Argentine 
government in response to their protest of the 1832 British 
occupation of the islands, stated that: "The Government of 
the United Provinces could not reasonably have anticipated 
that the British Government would permit any other state to 
exercise its right as derived from Spain which Great Britain 
had denied to Spain herself. ,,30 
International laws concerning sovereignty have changed 
29. Peter J. Beck, "The Anglo-Argentine Dispute Over 
Title to the Falkland Islands: Changing British Perceptions 
on Sovereignty since 1910," Millennium 12 (Spring 1983): 11. 
30. Quoted in Leslie C. Green, "The Falklands, The Law 
and the War," in Yearbook of World Affairs (London: Stevens 
and Sons, 1984), 103. 
21 
since 1833, so the British claim has also undergone serious 
re-assessment by the Foreign Office. In 1910 the Foreign 
Office created a forty-nine page memorandum which cast ser-
ious doubt about the British claims to the islands before 
1833. The sentiments of the Foreign Office can be summar-
ized by a minute written by Gerald Spicer the head of the 
Americas Department in December of 1910: "from a perusal of 
this memo it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
Argentine government's attitude is not altogether unjust-
ified, and that our action has been somewhat high-handed. ,,31 
By the 1930s, however the British government's position 
concerning to its claim had shifted. It tended to disregard 
the question of the status of the islands in 1833 and 
stressed the over one hundred years of continuous occu-
pation. In 1936 Anthony Eden suggested that the British 
claims to the islands had until this point been argued upon 
the wrong principles and that the: 
One hundred years' possession, whether disputed or 
not, should found a perfectly sound title to sov-
ereignty in international law ... Meanwhile, each 
year that passes, and in addition the celebrations 
of the centenary of Britain's occupati~2' streng-
thens His Majesty's Government's case. 
In 1982 the British based their claim to the islands on two 
principles, prescription and the right of the islanders to 
self-determination. In July of 1982, Francis Pym, the 
Foreign Secretary advised Labour MP (Member of Parliament) 
31. Quoted in Beck, "The Anglo-Argentine Dispute," 13. 
32. Ibid., 15. 
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Tam Dalyell that the British were not basing their claim on 
pre-1833 factors, many of which strengthen the British case, 
but on the facts of prescription and self-determination. 33 
It is clear then that the Argentine claim to the is-
lands is based upon succession to the Spanish titles, the 
continuity of the continental shelf connecting the islands 
and the mainland and by occupation of the islands by Argen-
tina in her own right in 1820. The British on the other 
hand point not only to their pre-1833 claims to the islands 
but also to the rights of prescription, the fact that they 
have held the islands for over one hundred and fifty years, 
have the longest standing settlement in the history of the 
islands. Finally, they assert the right of self-deter-
mination for the islanders who wish to remain British. 
Evaluation of the Two Claims 
How then might a final decision awarding clear 
sovereignty over the islands be made? An international 
commission or tribunal would decide which claimant has the 
stronger title to the islands. Due to the fact that inter-
national relations are not isolated, legal evaluations would 
b ff ' d t t' f . t' t' 34 e a lxe 0 a cer aln re erence pOln ln lme. In 
the case of the Falkland Islands, however, this specific 
reference point is difficult to determine. The importance 
33. Bluth, 7 
34. Hope, 416. 
of such a date is not hard to discover though. The prin-
ciple behind the reference date is that the status of the 
islands in that year would determine their present and 
future legal connections. 35 What this means is that if an 
international tribunal determines a critical date and also 
determines that Argentina was the sovereign at that time 
then the islands today would have to be turned over to the 
Argentine government. There are several possible key dates 
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in the history of the islands. The most important dates and 
ones in which legal title to islands can be determined are 
1767, 1774, 1816/1820 and 1833. The Argentine government 
advocates the establishment of 1816/1820 as the reference 
date while the British argue that 1833 is the most approp-
riate date. 
1767 is offered as the first important date because it 
established the claim by discovery and occupation. Because 
the first settlement of the islands followed well after any 
discovery claims this claim to title of the islands cannot 
be accepted. The International Commission of Jurists in 
1982 decided that: 
Considering that MacBride's settlement was separ-
ated by 200 years from Davis' sighting and by 100 
years from Strong's landing on the islands, it 
cannot be said that real possession ~~s effected 
by the British soon after discovery. 
What this in effect does is declare that even if the con-
35. Jennings, 32. 
36. Bluth, 6. 
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flicting claims of discovery were settled they would not 
mean much because of the great lapse of time between these 
acts of discovery and settlement. Therefore 1767 becomes 
the first important date because by this time both the 
French and British settlements had been established. 
The French were the first to establish a settlement and 
therefore hold the first title to the territory. The 
British, although they did establish a settlement on 
Saunders Island in 1765, the year after the French set-
tlement was established, have no legal claim on the islands 
at that time. Because the French were compelled to cede the 
islands to the Spanish, for whatever reasons, the legal 
title to islands transferred to them as well. 37 The 
Spanish did attempt to remove the British from the islands 
in 1771, an act that almost started a war between the two 
Kingdoms, but the two sides came to an agreement on the 
islands and issued joint declarations. These declarations 
have often been cited by both sides as to legal title to the 
islands. The Spanish claim that the declarations restored 
British sovereignty to the settlement at Port Egmont only 
and did so on the condition that it be recognized as a 
British base on Spanish territory. Furthermore the British 
left the island just three years later. The British claim 
that they did not relinquish their claim to the islands with 
the 1771 declarations and that upon leaving the islands the 
37. Ibid., 10. 
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erected a plaque on one of the buildings proclaiming British 
. I h' I d 38 t1t e to t e 1S an s. The legal status of the islands 
between 1774 and 1811 must be with the Spanish, however, as 
"an abstract title without effective possession cannot pre-
vail over a constant and effective manifestation of auth-
ority.,,39 
The status of the islands in 1811 when the Spanish left 
was definitely that they were Spanish possessions. Why then 
has there been a question to the legal status of the 
islands? Should Argentina not have legally gained cession 
of the islands in 1816 when the United Provinces gained 
their own independence? Even if the principle of uti 
possidetis was not legally binding on the Falklands 40 , it is 
clear that the Spanish left the islands and did not offer 
any protest over the Argentine declarations of 1816, 1820 or 
1829, thereby granting their acquiescence to Argentine 
. t 41 soverelgn y. The British, however, did protest the 
Argentine declarations and in 1829 the British sent a letter 
of pro test to the Argentine government. As this protest 
came several years after the initial declarations and after 
Argentina had demonstrated its sovereignty over the islands, 
38. Myhre, 32. 
39. Blum, 202. 
40. Mueller, 627 argues that the principle of uti 
possidetis is not binding on territory disputes involving 
those states that did not expressly accept the doctrine. 
41. Hope, 418. 
26 
the protests came too late to prevent Argentina from gaining 
sovereign right to the islands in 1816 through settlement of 
. d . 42 unoccup1e terr1tory. 
The British advocate the use of 1833 as the reference 
date for the consideration of the legal title to the 
islands. The British suggest this date because they know of 
the weakness of their pre-1833 claims. The British promote 
1833 because that was the year that the British re-estab-
lished a settlement on the islands. They effectively held 
the islands continuously until the Argentine invasion of 2 
April 1982. The British now claim that they hold legal 
title to the islands because of prescription. They argue 
that regardless of how they gained occupation of the 
islands, their near one-hundred-fifty-year control of the 
islands transferred all legal title to the British. Accor-
ding to the principles of prescription the fact that The 
United Kingdom held the islands for just under one-hundred-
fifty years argues in favour of the British title to the 
islands. This title is legal regardless of the legal status 
of the islands before the occupation and the fact that force 
was used to remove the residents of the islands. 43 
The legality of prescription in international law is 
tenuous not only because it is not universally accepted as a 
principle of international law but also because certain 
42. Mueller, 630. 
43. Bluth, 7. 
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conditions must accompany the occupation. D.H.N. Johnson 
has argued that a title by prescription is not valid unless 
the state can demonstrate that it has occupied the ter-
ritory: in a peaceful and continuous manner, to which all 
other states have acquiesced; without recognizing any other 
claims on the territory; in public; and for a certain length 
of time. 44 Brian Mueller suggests that Britain has in fact 
demonstrated all of these requirements since 1833. Britain 
has governed the islands peacefuly and continuously; has 
refused to acknowledge any other claim to the islands; has 
governed the islands in full public view; and has remained 
45 
on the islands close to one-hundred-fifty years. 
Argentina protested the British action up until 1849 but 
then fell silent on the issue until 1884 when Argentina 
proposed that the issue should go to an international 
arbitration hearing. This thirty-five-year gap, between 
1849 and 1884 helps to prove the acquiescence that the 
British claim needed. Such acquiescence is derived when the 
affected state fails to make any protest or attempts to 
bring the matter to the attention of an international organ-
ization or tribunal in a reasonable amount of time. 46 
44. D.H.N. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in 
International Law," The British Year Book of International 
Law 27 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950): 353. 
45. Mueller, 633-634. 
46. Johnson, 353-354. 
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Sovereignty Rights Over the Dependencies 
The arguments above are over the Falkland Islands them 
selves, but what is the legal status of the dependencies, 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands? This question 
brings a new dimension to the legal status of the Argentine 
actions in 1982, as it was events on South Georgia that 
increased tensions between the two sides immediately before 
the Argentine military invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 
1982. 
The British claim that the legal status of the de pen-
dencies is entirely separate from that of the Falklands, but 
that for convenience the dependencies are administered by 
the Falkland Islands government. Britain bases its claim to 
the dependencies on the facts that the islands were dis-
covered by Captain Cook in 1775; annexed in 1908, through 
Letters Patent; and have been continuously administered by 
the British since. 47 Furthermore, neither these acts of 
sovereignty nor the ordinances issued by the British over 
whaling rights in the dependencies' waters have been 
protested by the Argentine government. The British also 
claim that there has been an administrative presence on the 
dependencies, in the person of a resident magistrate (who 
also serves as the Base Commander for the Antarctic Survey 
St t · . 48 a ~on), s~nce 1909. It can be said that the British 
47. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Falkland 
Islands: The Facts, (1982): 4. 
48. C.R. Symmons, "Who Owns the Falkland Island 
Dependencies in International Law? An Analysis of Certain 
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have, in regard to the dependencies, exercised and displayed 
sovereignty over the islands and have done so under the 
conditions necessary to claim legal title through occu-
pation. The British have maintained a peaceful, public, 
continuous and sufficiently long administration to claim 
sovereignty rights over the Falkland Islands Dependencies. 49 
On the other hand, the Argentine government claims the 
islands through its claims on the Falkland Islands. The 
theory behind this claim is that since the dependencies are 
administered through the government at Port Stanley and 
since the Argentinians consider the Falkland Islands to be 
theirs, they claim a modern day principle of uti possidetis 
applies to the dependencies. 50 The Argentinians claim that 
the Spanish discovered the islands in 1756 and therefore 
they gain the rights to the islands through rights of 
Spanish succession. They go further to point out that the 
first whaling station on the island was established through 
Argentine laws on South Georgia in 1904. Argentina adds to 
its claim the fact that several Argentine-registered ships 
made trips to and from the islands in order to resupply a 
scientific expedition on the South Orkney Islands, between 
Recent British and Argentine Official Statements," 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 33 (July 1984): 
728-31. 
49. C.H.M. Waldock, "Disputed Sovereignty in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies," The British Year Book of 
International Law 25 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1948): 346. 
50. Symmons, 731-34. 
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1904 and 1982. The Argentinians also claim that on several 
of these trips members of the Argentine Coast Guard were 
aboard the ships and reiterated Argentine claims to the 
islands. Finally the Argentine government in 1977 estab-
lished a scientific station on Morrell Island (the most 
southern island in the South Sandwich chain) and it has 
. d . 51 rema~ne open ever s~nce. 
The question therefore is whether these scientific 
expeditions by the Argentinians can counter the claims made 
by the British. The various claims made by Argentina over 
the dependencies are based on limited Argentine activity on 
the islands between 1904 and 1982. Constant British 
activity on the islands offers support to the claim that the 
dependencies are British territory under international law. 
The question of title to the Falkland Islands proper 
remains. 
Self-Determination 
The question of self-determination creates a major 
impediment to the determination of legal ownership of the 
Falkland Islands, and both the British and Argentine govern-
ments have proposed very different answers. The Argentine 
government proposed that the true 'self' of the islands were 
removed in 1832 by the British and that the Argentine people 
are the rightful descendants of the islands. 52 The 
51. Destefani, 111-129 passim. 
52. Bluth, 9. 
British, however, claim that the current islanders are the 
self because they have lived on a clearly defined territory 
for generations. The British added to this claim by 
reminding the Argentinians that although it was true that 
the original settlers of the islands originated from the 
colonial homeland, most of the Argentinians have also 
descended from a European mother country. If the European 
settlers truly wanted self-determination for the new world 
territories then they should return the continent to the 
Mayans, Aztecs and other native tribes. The Islanders have 
an additional claim to the right to remain under British 
rule, and that is that they remain full British citizens no 
matter how long they or their descendants live on the 
. I d 53 1S an s. 
Summary of the Legal Claims 
In summary to the legality of the opposing claims, the 
one aspect of this debate that is clear is that the legal 
title to the Falkland Islands is not as straight-forward as 
the two governments would have the world believe. Strong 
31 
support exists for both claims to the islands. The islands 
may belong to the British through the principles of 
prescription and self-determination, or they may be the 
53. Lowell S. Gustafson, "The Principle of Self-
determination and the Dispute about Sovereignty over the 
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands," Inter-American Economic 
Affairs 37 (Spring 1984): 85, 94-96. 
32 
property of Argentina under the principles of cession of the 
Spanish rights and of occupation after the Spanish abandoned 
the islands in 1811. This question of legality does not 
stop at the question of ownership, however. Whether either 
side had the right under international law to escalate the 
conflict into a military confrontation must also be inves-
tigated. Ultimately this answer will depend on one's 
assessment of the legal status of the islands, as a state 
cannot be held to be an aggressor if that country is 
attempting to dislodge a foreign power from its sovereign 
territory. 
Given the relative strength of both claims and the fact 
that the ultimate judgement concerning sovereignty over the 
islands must be made by an international court which must 
decide upon a crucial date, perhaps the strongest argument 
that can be made for sovereignty over the islands is based 
on the right of conquest. "He is sovereign who can defend 
his sovereignty.,,54 Right from the initial hostilities 
between Britain and Span in 1770, the islands have only once 
changed hands peacefuly and that was when Spain left the 
islands to consolidate its power during the Napoleonic wars. 
The history of the islands has shown that whoever has the 
power to hold the islands has the power to declare its 
sovereignty over them. The Spaniards could not keep the 
British off the islands in 1771 by use of force; Vernet was 
54. Liebniz quoted in Green, note 57, 106. 
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expelled from the islands by the Americans using superior 
firepower; and the Argentine military could not muster 
enough power to dislodge the British in 1833. The British 
Royal Marines failed to repel the Argentine invaders on 2 
April 1982 and subsequently the Argentine military could not 
stop the British Armada from re-taking South Georgia on 25 
April nor from capturing Port Stanley, thereby regaining 
total control of the Falkland Islands on 14 June 1982. 
The Right to Intervene under International Law 
International Laws Governing Intervention 
What rights do states have to use intervention to 
settle international conflicts? It is not an easy task to 
find a definition for intervention primarily because it is 
in most states' best interest to keep the definition ambiv-
alent. Intervention can range from mere interference in 
another state's affairs to direct military intervention. 55 
International law governing the rights of intervention 
has a history that starts in the eighteenth century. As 
with the laws concerning sovereignty, the best authority 
with whom to start any examination of international law is 
Vattel. In his third volume of Law of Nations, Vattel 
argues that a foreign country can rightfully give military 
55. Rosalyn Higgins, "Intervention and International 
Law," in Intervention in World Politics, ed. Hedley Bull 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986): 30. 
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aid to any oppressed people who ask for that aid. All 
countries have the right and duty to help a people depose 
any tyrant, but to aid a tyrant suppress his people would be 
56 truly a violation of the country's duty. To Vattel, not 
only did a country have the right to intervene but also the 
duty to aid any and all liberation movements, to use a 
modern term, which were truly democratic and it was unlawful 
and immoral to assist any tyrant or would-be tyrant. 
Vattel's principle is no longer accepted as legal 
justification for military intervention in a sovereign coun-
try's domestic affairs. The principle is not dead, however, 
and modified versions of it are found not in international 
law but in international politics, where countries use it to 
justify their actions to the world. In the modern world the 
conditions through which a war can be described as just-
ifiable have narrowed considerably and applies only to 
instances of self-defence. 57 
After the horrors of the First World War, international 
law was modified to accept only self-defence as a legal 
justification of war. This principle was maintained by the 
United Nations. The UN Charter states that: 
all members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any other state, or in any other manner 
56. Vattel Law of Nations, vol. III 1758, quoted in 
Lloyd N. Cutler, "The Right to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 
64 (1985): 97. 
57. Cutler, 98. 
inc~nsis~ant with the Purposes of the United 
Natl.ons. 
The United Nations does permit the use of force by the 
members but only in three instances. According to chapter 
VII, the Security Council may authorize states to use force 
in order to maintain or restore peace and security to an 
35 
area. Under this chapter the Security Council can determine 
the reality of any threat to international peace and then 
decide what action needs to be taken and by whom. This 
chapter also presents the second justification for the use 
of force in the Charter under Article 51. This article 
provides the primary exception to Article 2(4): supporting 
self-defence actions whether they be individual or col-
lective by members of the UN, even when the Security Council 
is unable to agree on what needs to be done to restore 
international peace and security. The final justification 
for the use of force is found in chapter VIII, which allows 
regional organizations to take action as authorized by the 
S . t C 'I 59 ecurl y ounCl . 
Although the UN Charter in Article 103 asserts its pre-
dominance, during any international conflict, over any other 
international agreement, it is not the sole source of inter-
national law. Customary international law agreements and 
General Assembly resolutions can also determine the legality 
58. Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(4). 
59, Michael J. Levitin, HThe Law of Force and the Force 
of Law," Harvard International Law Journal 27 (Spring 
1986): 627-30. 
of the use of force. 60 Technically, General Assembly 
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resolutions are not legally binding, however. 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations is a good example. The declaration was the result 
of several years of legal negotiations and attempts to 
refine the articles on the use of force in the Charter. It 
concludes that the use of force is unlawful and that no 
state or group of states ever has the legal right to inter-
vene either directly or indirectly in the affairs of another 
state. Under this declaration no state shall exert pres-
sure, either political or economic, to coerce another state 
to cede its sovereign rights. Nor do states have the right 
to support or finance any subversive group that plots the 
violent overthrow of any sovereign government. 61 
In opposition to this declaration are the principles of 
humanitarian intervention and intervention by invitation. 
Some international jurists argue that states may intervene 
with military force to protect the interests of their 
citizens threatened by an international incident in a 
foreign country. Many others, however, argue that this is 
not a legal principle and that any claim to be acting under 
humanitarian grounds is merely political rhetoric used to 
justify acts of aggression. Second, the principle of invi-
60. Ibid., 631. 
61. Higgins, 37-38. 
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tation by one government to a second to intervene in its 
domestic affairs seems to lead to another abuse of political 
rhetoric to justify aggression. This doctrine is open to 
criticism primarily because the realities within the host 
country are often difficult to discover, and it is impos-
sible to ascertain whether the host country acted on its own 
initiative or was coerced into issuing the invitation. 62 
Many treaties and pacts signed by both Argentina and 
the United Kingdom denounce the use of force in inter-
national relations. In 1928 Great Britain signed the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the signatories, Great Britain, 
the United States, Germany, Italy, France and Japan, all 
resolved not to resort to force in their relations with one 
another. Since this pact was completed outside of the 
League of Nations and complies with the UN Charter, it is 
still technically in force. Even though Argentina did not 
sign the pact, and it was broken by the actual signatories, 
the principles behind the pact represent a growing consensus 
among the international community. Similarly, Argentina was 
instrumental in the creation of the Inter-American Treaty of 
1933. This treaty condemns the use of wars of aggression in 
their mutual relations and in relations with other states, 
and asserts that all international disputes should be set-
tled using peaceful means and through international law. 63 
62. Levitin, 631-634. 
63. Alberto R. ColI, "Philosophical and Legal 
Dimensions of the Use of Force in the Falklands War," in The 
Falklands War: Lessons for strategy, Diplomacy, and 
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Argentina is also a member of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), whose Charter states that no member state "has 
the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State. 11 64 
To sum up these various principles of international law 
it would seem that there is very little legal justification 
for the use or threat of force in international relations. 
The United Nations, the dominant source of international 
law, restricts the use of force to acts of self-defence. 
Other treaties and international agreements follow this 
principle and many go so far as to eliminate military inter-
vention as a legitimate tool of international relations. 
Argentina and the United Kingdom have signed similar trea-
ties and both are members of international organizations 
that prohibit the use of force, except in those cases where 
they are acting in self-defence and in accordance with the 
Security Council of the UN. 
Failure of International Law 
to Settle the Dispute 
Given these strict constraints on the use of force to 
settle international disputes, why have there been so many 
conflicts since 1945, and more specifically, why did inter-
International Law, ed. Alberto R. ColI and Anthony Arend, 
(Boston: G. Allen and Unwin Co., 1985), 37-38. 
64. Article 18, Charter of the OAS. quoted in Cutler, 
98. 
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national law fail to resolve the dispute before force was 
used in the Falklands conflict in 1982? Both governments 
claimed to be acting legally and both claimed rights under 
international law for their military actions. Argentina 
claimed it had legal title to the islands and was only 
. . f 't . t 't 65 recover1ng a p1ece 0 1 S sovere1gn err1 ory. 
Meanwhile, the British called the Argentine action an act of 
aggression and justified their military response under 
Article 51 of the Charter, claiming that British territory 
had been seized and that they had the right to self-
66 defence. 
To understand why peaceful means were not used to solve 
the dispute, it is necessary first to examine why Argentina 
felt it was necessary to seize the islands by force and 
second why the United Kingdom also felt it necessary to 
respond with force. Argentina gave two general reasons for 
its use of force. First, Britain's occupation of the 
islands violated international law and the islands, in fact, 
belonged to Argentina. Second, because Argentina had been 
patient and had searched for a peaceful solution it was 
justified in using force to settle the issue. 67 
The first justification the Argentinians used in their 
defence of the use of force was that the territory was, in 
65. Green, 110. 
66. Bluth, 9. 
67. Coll, 41. 
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reality Argentine territory and that they were merely expel-
ling a foreign military presence on their sovereign ter-
ritory. Because of this claim the Argentinians did not 
consider themselves to have violated any United Nations 
principles by using force on the Falklands. The United 
Nations supports the right of member states to conduct 
. 1 ff . f f" t t' 68 R Y 1nterna a a1rs away rom any ore1gn 1n erven 10n. .. 
Jennings supports this principle and states that: 
If in fact its claim is justified, that is to say 
if it does indeed have the legal title to the 
sovereignty, then it would seem that this is not 
an employment of force contrary to the provisions 
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. It cannot be 
force used against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State because 
the actor State is merely occupying its own 
territory. Tg~ matter is one within its domestic 
jurisdiction. 
This right may exist, but since the legal status of the 
islands' sovereignty is in doubt and since the Argentine 
claim to the islands does have some disputed factors, it is 
not possible to claim that Argentina was acting in self-
defence and in response to British aggression. Jennings 
adds an explanation to this point. The legal right to 
reoccupy territory: 
is only true if the claim to possess title is 
indeed well founded. And since the establishment 
of a valid title is ... by no means a simple 
matter, it is not to be expected that a particular 
issue of title will be so very clear as to justify 
forcible action by a clai'8nt State on the mere 
strength of its own case. 
68. Ibid., 42. 
69. Jennings, 72. 
41 
The second justification offered by the Argentine 
government must therefore be examined. The Argentineans 
claim that negotiations had failed and that no other peace-
ful method was open to them, and therefore they were entit-
led to use force to remove the British presence on the 
islands. Negotiations concerning the islands had been 
undertaken between the two countries since 1965. Both 
governments had expressed their pleasure at the pace of the 
talks. Because there were questions about the actual sov-
ereignty rights over the islands, the pace of the nego-
tiations could only be expected to be slow. In fact, the 
ability of the United Kingdom and Argentina to come to an 
agreement on many functional links between the islands and 
the mainland, such as travel, communications and economic 
contacts, speaks well of the talks' progress. Although the 
two sides were still far apart on the issue of sovereignty, 
major steps had been taken and over time these could have 
led to the actual settlement of the dispute. Far from the 
negotiations having run their course, many possibilities had 
opened up in the latest round of talks just over a month 
. 71 prevlous. 
Furthermore, the Argentine claim that the UN Charter 
gave them the right to resort to force after peaceful means 
had failed is not correct. The UN Charter is quite specific 
70. Ibid. 
71. ColI, 41-42. 
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in its refusal to allow any state to resort to force except 
in self-defence. The Charter establishes the Security 
council as the final arbitrator of any dispute that has not 
been solved through peaceful means. Article 37 states that 
parties to a dispute, should peaceful methods fail, are to 
f h th S . C '1 72 re er t e matter to e ecur~ty ounC1 . 
Emilio Cardenas, Professor of Law at the University of 
Buenos Aires, adds to the justification for the use of force 
by stating that the aggression did not start on 2 April 
1982. Rather, Argentina was the victim of British threats 
of aggression against workmen who had been commissioned to 
dismantle an old whaling station on South Georgia. Cardenas 
goes further to argue that the April invasion of the 
Falkland Islands was not aggression but a reaction to the 
British threat to force the Argentinians off South 
G . 73 eorgl.a. 
The British response to this use of force was to 
dispatch a naval task force with the objective of removing 
the Argentine forces occupying the Falklands. The British 
justified their use of force in this instance by claiming 
the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The difference between the British claim to be 
acting under international law and the Argentine claim under 
the same article of the UN Charter is that the United 
72. Ibid., 42. 
73. Emilio J. Cardenas, "Correspondence," American 
Journal of International Law 77 (1983): 607. 
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Kingdom can add to its justification the fact that it was 
were in fact resorting to force in self-defence after 
exhausting all peaceful means. Argentina was in violation 
of Security Council Resolution 502, which ordered the 
immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces and the peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. 
In his address to the Security Council Sir Anthony 
Parsons, The United Kingdom's Permanent Representative to 
the UN, stated that following the adoption of Resolution 502 
Argentina rejected the resolution in practice. Instead of 
withdrawing troops, Argentina reinforced its military units. 
Furthermore they imposed a military governor on the islands 
which had until then enjoyed a democratically elected 
government. The United Kingdom claimed the right to self 
defence because: British territory had been invaded by 
Argentina, British nationals were being subjected to both 
military occupation and government against their will, and 
Resolution 502 had proved to be insufficient to bring about 
withdrawal. The British government was still open to any 
peaceful settlement but was prepared to use military forces 
to bring the situation to a resolution. 74 
Ultimately, international law concerning the right to 
use force only in self-defence seems to be open to many 
interpretations. The Argentine government claimed that the 
74. Text of the Speech by Sir Anthony Parsons, to the 
United Nations Security Council on 21 May 1982 in, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Britain and the Falklands Crisis; A 
Documentary Record. (1982): 77-82. 
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British occupation of the Falkland Islands between 1833 and 
1982 was a breach of the peace and security of the region. 
Argentina therefore was legally entitled to use force to 
remove the British forces from what they considered Argen-
tine territory. Given the weakness of the Argentine 
claim to be acting under international law, why did the 
government flaunt international law, suffer the UN condem-
nation of its use of force and resort to force to take the 
island in 1982? The answer may lie in the role of domestic 
considerations in the Argentine government's decision-making 
process. This possibility will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
The British claimed to be acting under international 
law but does this fully explain the British rationale behind 
the decision to use force to reclaim the islands? Just as 
domestic considerations might have played a role in the 
Argentine decision, so could they have shaped the British 
decision-making process. 
CHAPTER TWO 
DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATIONS: SIGNALING 
AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
IntroQuction 
Irrespective of the legal considerations relating to 
the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands there are the 
political decisions made before and during the crisis that 
shaped the nature of the conflict. Each government per-
ceived the situation differently and had its own constraints 
and the options from which it could choose the most appro-
priate response, The British government and Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher had specific considerations to include in 
their evauation of the crisis and options available to them 
to deal with the crisis, In addition to other consider-
ations, the British government had to deal with the fact 
that before the crisis the governing Conservative party was 
disliked by the British electorate, The Argentine junta 
also had its own specific considerations as did its leader 
General Galtieri, One of the most important considerations 
for the military government, and the President, was the 
level of popular support for the government, It might seem 
strange for military regilnes to be concerned with this but 
Argentine military regimes have traditionally displayed a 
concern over their domestic popularity,1 
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In the years leading up to the Argentine invasion, 
signals were exchanged between the two governments which 
would normally have crystallized the two sides' positions 
and attitudes towards each other over the Falkland Islands. 
Regardless of their clarity or truthfulness, these signals 
were used in the decision-making process of each government 
when it evaluated the situation, its options and the con-
straints it was operating under. 
Political Decision-Making Process 
Republic of Argentina 
In order to understand the reasons for the Argentine 
military actions of 2 April 1982 it is necessary to under-
stand the role of the military in Argentine politics. The 
junta had certain options as well as constraints imposed 
upon it both internally and externally. As governments do 
not make decisions, especially decisions regarding foreign 
policy and war, in a vacuum it is necessary to examine the 
internal and external factors that influenced Argentine 
decision-making. As well as, what specific characteristics 
or ideologies affected the Argentine government's policy 
making process. Only then can any examination of the 
miscalculations made by the junta be undertaken. 
1. David L. Feldman, "Argentina, 1945-71," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24, no. 3 (1982): 
326. 
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Why should the military want to rule the country? It 
has been a long-standing tradition that the Argentine 
military was the moral protector of the people. It played 
the dominant role in the independence movements and has 
since been dominant in politics. Between 1945 and 1971 the 
military attempted thirty two unsuccessful coups and com-
pleted six successful ones. In addition, the military made 
two hundred-seven public statements and ultimatums to the 
government. They participated in thirty six instances of 
civilian relief through construction work, such as building 
bridges or spear-heading disaster relief operations and they 
have fought two civil wars. The military produces loco-
motives, heavy machinery, civilian aircraft, as well as some 
2 
of its own military hardware. Through activities like 
these, the military governments in Argentina have demon-
strated a desired to be popular and to be 'one with the 
people' .3 
The most recent example of an Argentine military coup 
was in 1976 when General Jorge Videla ousted President 
Isabel Peron. The military has a history of intervention, 
but unlike other areas of the world the Latin American 
military regimes have a history of being of short duration. 
The military only steps in for a short period of time to 
correct what it regards as immediate threats to itself or 
2. Ibid., 326, 332. 
3. Guillermo Makin, "The Military in Argentine 
Politics, 1880-1982." Millennium 12 (Spring 1983): 63. 
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the country. In 1939, 1945, 1958, and 1963 the Argentine 
military has voluntarily stepped down from formal offices of 
power and has allowed elections or at least civilian rule. 4 
Why did the 1976 coup last until 1982, and why was it 
different from the previous short term military governments? 
The best answer to this question is that the military was 
overcome by the ideology of 'military developmentalism' . 
This ideology suggests that the military has a unique 
quality and that it is the only group that is able to carry 
out the necessary economic reforms before the country can be 
returned to civilian rule. Because this process is a 
lengthy one, the military must remain in power for longer 
periods of time, especially if they face an economy that was 
in as much trouble as the Argentine economy was in 1976. 
Argentina in 1976 faced an incredible three hundred percent 
inflation rate. The military attempted to fight inflation 
through neoconservative fiscal responsibility, instigating 
rapid devaluation and reducing the interest rates to double 
digits,5 
In addition to this war on the economy the Argentine 
military leaders instigated a war on terrorists and other 
opponents of the government. This turned into a war of 
oppression where the goal was to stamp out all armed ter-
rorism. The effect of this 'Dirty War' was the elimination 
4. Peter Calvert, The Falklands Crisis: the Rights and 
Wrongs (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), 27-28. 
5. Ibid., 28. 
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of all leftist opposition, and as a consequence some ten to 
twenty thousand Argentine citizens went 'missing'. The 
military, having control of all mass media functions, not 
surprisingly, censored all references to this campaign. The 
only evidence that people had disappeared was the weekly 
silent vigils of the 'Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo'. These 
demonstrations consisted of relatives of the missing 
parading around the Plaza de Mayo holding placards depicting 
h d . t f th . . 6 t e names an p~c ures 0 e m~ss~ng. 
Videla served as President for five years. This term 
of office was the longest held by any military leader in 
modern Argentine history. When he came to power he attacked 
two problems, the rising activity of terrorism and the 
disastrous economy. Videla in his first years accomplished 
both goals, as trade unions were disbanded, political 
parties abolished and the Legislature dissolved. The 
junta's primary goal in the 'Dirty War' was achieved in 1980 
as all overt military opposition to the regime had been 
destroyed. Videla clamped down on government spending and 
streamlined the bureaucracy, which had the desired effect of 
reducing the inflation rate to acceptable levels. In 1981, 
however, the situation had reversed and the economy deter-
iorated to such a level that the military realized that 
7 Videla's effectiveness was over. 
6. Ibid., 26-27. 
7. R. Reginald, and Dr. Jeffrey M. Elliot. Tempest in 
a Teapot. (San Bernadino: The Borogo Press, 1983), 36-37. 
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The military was not about to hand over the Presidency 
to a civilian however. The military disliked the attitudes 
of those civilians who were capable of rising to political 
power. The military demanded political amnesty for their 
crimes committed during the 'Dirty War'. This the civilians 
were not willing to grant. It was decided that Videla had 
to be replaced, but as they distrusted the possible civilian 
candidates they agreed only to a semi-constitutional govern-
ment that would oversee the transition from military to 
civilian rule. The military reshuffled its ranks and 
appointed General Roberto Viola to the office of President 
to oversee the transition to civilian rule. Viola was a 
leader who held the respect and support of the leaders and 
general ranks of all three arms of the Argentine military.8 
During the eight month Viola administration American 
and Argentine relations were strengthened. The Argen-
tinians, especially the head of the army, General Galtieri, 
were quick to assist the Americans with their support of the 
Contra rebels against the Sandinista regime of Nicaragua. 
The Argentinians deployed five hundred advisors in Honduras 
to aid the Contra rebels who were staging raids into 
N" f b "'d d 9 lcaragua rom ases lnSl e Hon uras. 
Viola's term as President was short for two reasons. 
His health deteriorated and he was unable to shift the 
8. Calvert, The Rights and Wrongs, 29-30. 
9. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the 
Falklands (London: Pan Books, 1983), 62. 
steady decline of the economy. Viola officially retired 
from office for reasons of health and was quickly replaced 
by General Galtieri in December 1981. 10 
The political situation as the Argentina junta saw it 
in 1982 was that the new government had just taken office 
after a bloodless coup that installed General Galtieri as 
President. Galtieri also held the office of Commander-in-
Chief of the Argentine army and, as such, was a member of 
the three-man junta that held effective power over the 
country. When General Galtieri took office in 1981, he did 
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not personally wield supreme executive power. His power was 
diminished because all decisions had to be made by consensus 
of the three-man junta. In addition to this, Galtieri would 
lose his seat on the junta as his term as commander of the 
army would be lost to him in the later half of 1982 due to a 
pre-arranged military reshuffle. He had to act fast as he 
had to mobilize enough popular support to give him a legit-
imate base of power as President once he lost the command of 
the army. The best possible method to gain this popularity 
was to achieve a great victory either over the economy or 
some other aspect of Argentine life. There was not much in 
the domestic politics of Argentina that offered this quick 
big victory: Galtieri inherited an Argentina that was at the 
brink of financial collapse 11 and faced serious 
10. Ibid., 63. 
11. For a detailed account of the economic crisis in 
Argentina see Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano. rgentina: 
The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule. Translated by 
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civilian opposition. The inflation rate was at approx-
imately one hundred and fifty percent and the people were 
starting openly to protest the 'Dirty War' that the military 
had 'd t th t' 12 carrle ou over e pas nlne years. 
The one aspect that held the military in power was the 
'Dirty War' and the possible repercussions that any later 
civilian government would impose on the military. Any pos-
sible transition to civilian rule had to be under the 
military's control. An Argentine businessman was quoted in 
the Sunday Times on 23 May 1982 as saying that the military 
had taken power in 1976 to fight the terrorists. Everyone 
in Argentina agreed that the terrorists must be stopped but 
because the military used illegal tactics the process had 
13 got out of control. Now the military wanted to get clean 
again and remove the image of six thousand missing people 
from its history. Galtieri saw that a military victory 
would put the military back on the heroes' podium. With 
this victory the military could either continue to rule the 
country or dictate the terms under which any succession to 
civilian rule would be made. 
This position was justified in the first few weeks 
after the invasion of the Falkland Islands, when the right-
Ralph Johnstone. London: Verso Editions, 1984, Chapter 3. 
12. Paul Eddy and Magnus Linklater, ed. War in the 
Falklands. (London: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1982), 64-69. 
13. Isabel Hilton, "Why Galtieri has to Fight." Sunday 
Times (London), 23 May 1982, 18-19. 
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wing political parties and many members of the Peronist 
party openly supported the military's move. Two explan-
ations have been suggested for this support. The first was 
that the Falklands represented a national cause and as such 
any regime that regained Argentine sovereignty over the 
islands deserved to be supported. The second was that the 
parties jumped on the bandwagon in order to keep some 
popular support as the general public in Argentina was quick 
. . 1 h f th' . 14 to vo~ce ~ts p easure over t e news 0 e ~nvas~on. This 
adds support to the argument that Galtieri executed the 
invasion in order to gain personal popularity. Not only did 
his regime gain public approval, but it also gained support 
from its political opponents. 
As the Argentine summer drew to an end on 30 March 1982 
the military faced for the first time since 1976 widespread 
public demonstrations of discontent with the military rule. 
The regime faced a lower level of popular support than any 
of the previous military regimes had held. Each military 
government before it had been able to demobilize its polit-
ical apparatus and return to the barracks with an agreement 
between the military and the new civilian government. The 
economic realities and the public displeasure with the 
'Dirty War' signaled to the military leaders that the mili-
tary was not going to be allowed to just return to the 
barracks. Galtieri felt that he had to negotiate a possible 
14. Makin, 321-322. 
demilitarization of the political process in Argentina with 
the civilian political parties and pressure groups from a 
position of strength. No other previous Argentine military 
regime had faced the possibility of military reform and 
civilian inquiries into past military policies. The only 
option open to the military and its corporate interests was 
to find a rallying point in its foreign policies. i5 
Galtieri needed a victory abroad. For this diversion-
ary victory he had two principal disputes to choose from. 
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The first was the dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel 
Islands. The second was the Falklands and the sovereignty 
dispute with the United Kingdom. The dispute with Chile 
over the Beagle Channel Islands goes back to a 1881 border 
treaty which gave the three islands of Picton, Lennox and 
Nueva to Chile. The dispute is over the claim by Argentina 
that the treaty does not grant Chile any territory in the 
Atlantic Ocean, in which it argues the islands lie. This 
dispute goes beyond mere control of the islands but to who 
16 
controls the strategic approaches to Cape Horn. This 
dispute has had a long history of escalations in the ten-
sions and repeated mediation attempts that have failed to 
satisfy the Argentine government. The Vatican entered the 
mediation attempt in the late 1970·s. The Pope had been 
unsuccessful in resolving the conflict but had restricted 
15. Ibid., 63-64. 
16. R. N. Gwynne, "Conflict in South America," 
Geographical Magazine 51 (March 1979): 398. 
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both sides from using military action in order to solve this 
dispute. "The Argentine Government could not ... escalate 
the conflict with Chile without breaking the solemn pledge 
not to do so that the Pope had wisely insisted on obtaining 
from both sides".17 
With the restrictions imposed by the Pope over the 
Beagle Channel dispute, Galtieri looked towards the Falkland 
Islands for his quick easy victory. The long-standing 
dispute with the United Kingdom seemed to be at a low ebb 
and the British looked as if they were getting tired of one 
of their last colonial possessions. The junta assessed the 
situation, through the signals exchanged between both 
countries (as will be discussed below), and decided that it 
had the military capability to successfully accomplish an 
invasion of the Falkland Islands and its dependencies. 
Galtieri also concluded that Argentina had enough strength 
to defend those islands against what he believed to be the 
most probable British response. The reconquest of the Falk-
lands was just the act that would rally the people around 
him and distract public attention from the domestic problems 
of Argentina. 
There were several military aspects that made the Falk-
lands even more attractive to Galtieri and the junta. The 
first was the presence of Chile in the South Atlantic due to 
an unfavorable settlement of the Beagle Channel Islands 
17. Calvert, The Rights and Wrongs, 53-54. 
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dispute. This could lead Chile to a political alliance with 
the United Kingdom against Argentina. Second, the British 
might grant the inhabitants of the islands some form of 
political autonomy and from that negotiations with the 
United States might establish an American naval presence on 
the islands. Third, the military government found its 
domestic options shrinking due to the rise of civilian 
unrest due to the poor economy and social upheaval due to 
the 'Dirty War' .18 
Unless it desired to oppose the Pope; the military 
found its hands tied in regard to the Beagle Channel dis-
pute. Galtieri had only one choice left. Under these 
circumstances it appears that the Argentine junta made a 
risky but calculated gamble to increase its prestige and 
ensure its own survival. The gamble paid off in the begin-
ning, and the Argentine population was distracted from its 
domestic problems, united in its support for the government 
that was returning the Falklands to Argentina. 19 
The big question remained however; what would the British 
response be to an Argentine invasion of the Falklands? 
The United Kingdom 
18. Carlos J. Moneta, "The Malvinas Conflict: Some 
Elements for an Analysis of the Argentinian Military Regimes 
Decision Making Process 1976-82." Millennium 13 (Winter 
1984): 318. 
19. J. Nef and F. Hallman, "Reflections on the Anglo-
Argentinian War," International Perspectives (Can) 
(September/October 1982): 7. 
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For the British the situation was very different than 
the Argentine government had estimated. The importance of 
the islands to the British and their resolve in keeping the 
islands under British rule was totally underestimated by the 
Argentine junta. The Thatcher government faced a blatant 
attack and subsequent loss of British territory, the capture 
of the Island's Governor and some sixty-four Royal Marines 
as well as the transformation of the islands' government 
from democratic to foreign military control. The goals for 
the British were to secure the safety of the islanders, the 
Governor and the Royal Marines captured in the invasion, to 
find a resolution to the crisis without losing any credibil-
ity as the defender of its other colonies, and to raise 
popular support for Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Govern-
ment. 
Of course the Thatcher government could have done 
nothing and ignored the fact that the Islands had been 
taken, but this could have meant political suicide for the 
Conservative Party. Public opinion was quickly demonstrated 
for the Thatcher government. As early as 14 April sixty 
percent of Britons were in favour of the Government's 
actions, and eighty three percent said that they cared that 
the islands should remain British. 20 Although it seems 
unlikely that popular opinion was considered during the 
process of making the decision to dispatch the task force, 
20. "Falkland Islands: The Fleet gets Closer than a 
Solution." Economist (17 April 1982), 21. 
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the popularity of that move was clearly a signal to the 
Thatcher government to continue the aggressive nature of its 
response. Secondly, the government had to reflect on how 
its non-action would be interpreted by others who had 
desires to control other British colonies. The invasion 
could clearly not be ignored, and effective action had to be 
taken. 21 
Although the British decision-making process during the 
crisis can be analyzed as being made in a rational manner, 
it is much more appropriate to view the British actions as 
not rational but emotional. The British decision making 
process was conducted by a small group of cabinet members 
and Prime Minister Thatcher. Clearly the initial inner 
cabinet meetings, held in the wake of the growing tensions 
on South Georgia, were classic examples of small group men-
tality. This mentality advocates that group decisions be 
made with little dissent or opposition to the leader's 
position. The little dissent or concern about the United 
Kingdom's capability of retaliating voiced by the Defence 
Minister John Nott was soon eliminated by the claims of the 
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Navy Staff, Admiral Sir 
Henry Leach, that the Royal Navy had the ability and 
willingness to sail a full fleet to quell any Argentine 
aggression in the area. Most of the participants in the 
cabinet meeting agreed that the arrival of Admiral Leach 
21. Hastings and Jenkins, 83. 
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made a drastic difference to the outcome of the meeting. 22 
Thatcher's use of the inner cabinet fits into this 
pattern as well, as all unfriendly advisors would be 
excluded from the key decision-making bodies. 
Mrs. Thatcher ... never found it (the full British 
cabinet) an easy body to handle .... It had never 
offered the cohesion and collective loyalty to 
which she felt entitled. As a result, she had 
come increasingly to take key decisions in sub-
committees and at bilateral meet~~gs from which 
her opponents could be excluded. 
When Thatcher was first elected to lead the Conser-
vative party she had very little support from the front-
benches. Even the Tory general election victory of 1979 did 
little to change the lack loyalty that the Cabinet showed 
her. It took two full years before Thatcher was able to 
bring the cabinet in line with her policies and priorities. 
She was able to make some minor adjustments in her Cabinet 
in September 1981 when several of the old-guard Tories were 
removed from the top cabinet posts and replaced by more 
loyal back-benchers. The war in the Falklands, however, 
gave Thatcher the popularity needed to remove the remaining 
24 
members of the old-guard. Although Thatcher lost some 
strong members of the cabinet, primarily the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington immediately after 
the invasion, Britain's victory appeared to vindicate 
22. Ibid., 86. 
23. Ibid., 96. 
24. Anthony Barnett, Iron Britannia: War Over the 
Falklands. (London: Allison and Busby, 1982), 70-71. 
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Thatcher's policies. 
One intriguing aspect of the British stance before the 
April 2 invasion was the position of the Falkland Islands 
dispute in the list of British priorities. "One of the most 
remarkable facts regarding the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 
was the fact that the issue had an extremely low priority 
25 before December 1981." The issues that topped the list of 
priorities included commitments to the West, specifically 
with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the 
special relationship with the United States, followed by, 
political and economic problems within the United Kingdom. 
High rates of unemployment had decreased the Thatcher 
government's popularity. The debate over the decision to 
defend the United Kingdom with nuclear or conventional 
forces, especially the Navy, was also on the minds of the 
British leaders. 26 Any concerns over social unrest or 
25. Virginia Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas War: Model 
for North-South Crisis Prevention (Winchester, MA: Allen & 
Unwin, 1987), 74, italicized in the original. 
26. This debate centered around what type of weapons 
the United Kingdom would need in order to maintain its 
security. One side of the debate favoured the continued use 
of the Polaris SLNM (Submarine Launched Nuclear Missile) 
until the 1990's when they would be replaced with the new 
Trident SLNM. This emphasis on the nuclear deterrent would 
make all Royal Navy surface vessels unnecessary. The other 
side advocated the need for a large surface fleet which 
would be able to deploy troops around the world and engage 
opponent fleets in conventional warfare. This type of fleet 
would be much more expensive as it would be centered around 
a large aircraft carrier. The question that needs to be 
answered in the wake of the Falkland Islands war is whether 
a Royal Navy centered around several Balistic Missile 
submarines would have deterred the Argentine aggression, 
because it is unlikely that such a fleet would have been 
effective once the Argentine forces were in possession of 
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internal or external threats to British territory were well 
d th I , t f ' 't' 27 own on e 1S 0 pr10r1 1es. Clearly the British 
government's ranking of any possible threats to its ter-
ritory showed that it had other reasons for responding to 
the Argentine military actions. These concerns, although 
officially clouded over by talk of principles, clearly 
represented the Thatcher government's concern over its 
popularity. 
Just as the Argentine junta needed to gain some much 
needed popularity, so did the Thatcher government. Through-
out 1981 the Thatcher government's popularity had dropped 
considerably. The country faced two million unemployed 
workers, a series of strikes by government workers, and num-
erous commercial bankruptcies. There was growing unrest in 
Northern Ireland as several IRA (Irish Republican Army) 
members were staging hunger strikes in British jails. 
Investment income was flooding out of the country in search 
of a more stable and prosperous investment opportunities. 
The Gross National Product had dropped substantially. Racial 
tensions had peaked in the inner cities. Finally, on the 
political field the newly formed Alliance between the Social 
Democrat and Liberal parties threatened the established 
power of the Labour and Conservative parties. 28 Although it 
the islands. 
27. Gamba, 74. 
28. Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the 
Belgrano (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), 21. 
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is hard to determine what effect these situations had on the 
Thatcher govern-ment's decision-making process it is hard to 
eliminate them from the process, especially in light of the 
reversal of popular opinion just after the invasion. 29 
Although the domestic considerations may not have held 
top priority officially, the British government would still 
have to deal with them eventually. Therefore the Thatcher 
government used the opportunity to rally around the flag and 
turn the crisis into a political triumph. The militaristic 
response to this act of aggression against the United King-
dom fitted well with the 'iron' image that had evolved 
around the Prime Minister. The dispatching of the Royal 
Navy to deal with a colonial problem played a familiar tune 
to the British population which had witnessed, since 1945, 
the withdrawal from almost all of the British colonies along 
with the overall decline of the United Kingdom's dominance 
in world affairs. The aggressive response to the Argentine 
invasion was able to soothe political and public opposition 
30 to the Thatcher government. 
Just how much did the Thatcher government's response 
depend on popular opinion in the United Kingdom? The 
Thatcher government before the crisis was one of the least 
popular British governments in the postwar period and soared 
29. The rise of the Conservative party in popular 
opinion will be discussed in more detail further in this 
chapter. 
30. Nef and Hallman, 7. 
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to become one of the most popular at the conclusion of the 
military campaign. 31 The initial opinion polls conducted on 
14 April 1982 for the Economist signaled to the government 
that sixty percent of those surveyed agreed with the govern-
ment's response to the invasion. 32 Another survey conducted 
seven days later, after the Government's weak response to 
the Haig shuttle proposal, suggested that the Government's 
popularity was starting to rise as thirty-six percent 
indicated that they would vote Conservative if an election 
was held the next day. The survey also reported an eight-
percent increase from the previous poll of popular approval 
of the Government's handling of the crisis. 33 
The Sunday Times reported their own opinion poll on 2 
May 1982. It was conducted after the British recaptured 
South Georgia on 25 April 1982 and reported that now forty-
three percent of Britons would vote Conservative if an 
election was held the next day. Further, sixty-two percent 
31. Before the invasion Conservative popular support 
was at roughly 34% and on 20 June 1982 it rose to 52%. David 
Lipsey, "Prouder to be British, say 4 Out of 5." Sunday 
Times (London), 20 June 1982, 3. All of the opinion polls 
cited in this section were conducted by "Market and Opinion 
Research International" (MORI) and either reported in the 
Economist or the Sunday Times. MORI conducted these surveys 
either through personal interviews at selected sampling 
points or by telephone surveys of the previously interviewed 
sample. MORI claims to have weighted the data as to sex, 
age, social class, and previous voting intention to be 
representative of the population of Great Britain. 
32. "Falkland Islands: The Fleet gets Closer than a 
Solution." Economist, (17 April 1982), 21. 
33. "Falkland Islands: Jaw-jaw Continues as War-war 
Approaches." Economist 24 April 1982, 27. 
thought that the government was correct in its readiness to 
use force. 34 Popular support dipped a little in the 
aftermath of the sinking of ARA General Belgrano and HMS 
Sheffield. The Economist reported on 8 May 1982 that 
satisfaction had peaked and that the percentage of the 
survey with Conservative voting intentions had dropped to 
thirty-seven percent. In spite of the lower popularity, 
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seventy-one percent of the survey still claimed to be 
satisfied with the government's handling of the situation. 35 
Later that month the government's popularity regained 
its strength and settled at roughly forty-nine percent 
popular support. During the week that the British landed 
troops on the Falkland Islands, the government's popularity 
increased again, although only slightly to fifty-one percent 
popular support. The percentage of Britons satisfied with 
the government's response also rose in this period to end 
36 the month of May to eighty-four percent. Finally, four 
days after the recapture of Port Stanley by the British 
forces the Conservative party held fifty-two percent of the 
popular support and eighty-one percent of Britons agreed 
that the British government had reacted properly to the 
crisis. 37 With popular support like this it seems unlikely 
34. Sunday Times (London), 2 May 1982, A1-A2. 
35. "Falkland Islands: Satisfaction Peaks." Economist 8 
May 1982, 25. 
36. "Falkland Islands: Rally Round the Tory Flag." 
Economist 29 May 1982, 19-23. 
37. David Lipsey, "Prouder to be British, say 4 Out of 
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that the previously disliked Thatcher government ignored the 
opinion polls when it made its decisions on the Falklands 
crisis. This is not to say that they made the initial 
decision to send the task force and other subsequent decis-
ions based solely on domestic considerations but that the 
domestic support given to the government made the decision 
to continue much easier to make. 
Signaling 
Why did the Argentine junta miscalculate the British 
response? Should they have known that the United Kingdom 
would not accept any military intervention to solve the 
sovereignty dispute? A secondary question to this is: did 
the United Kingdom or the Argentine junta send out or 
receive international signals that ran contrary to the 
intention of those signals' real meaning? These questions 
are very important. In order to answer them a general 
understanding of international signaling needs to be set out 
before any analysis of the signals and the political 
decisions involved can be accomplished. 
Role of Signaling in International Affairs 
One basic aspect of international relations is the 
principle that countries communicate between each other by 
exchanging international signals and indices. These signals 
5. II Sunday Times (London), 20 June 1982, 3. 
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need not be verbal declarations but any form of contact 
th h h ' h t ' t 't 't t' 38 roug w ~c a coun ry can commun~ca e ~ s ~n en ~ons. 
"Signals are statements or actions the meaning of which are 
defined by tacit or explicit understandings among the 
actors. ,,39 Signals range from domestic speeches, diplomatic 
notes, military manoeuvers, extending or breaking diplomatic 
relations, to choosing the shape of the negotiating table. 
Indices, on the other hand, are statements or actions which 
carry some inherent credibility and support the image being 
sent because they are linked to the actor's capabilities or 
. t t' 40 ~n en ~ons. 
Signals can be either words or actions and can range 
from more to less ambiguous. Without an accompanying mes-
sage some actions can be severely misinterpreted. Rarely is 
there only one prediction as to an actor's future behavior 
that can be made purely upon that actor's actions. Where 
statements are ambiguous actions can support one inter-
pretation over another. Words are cheap and are not of any 
particular value when they emanate from one's enemy. 
Actions, on the other hand, prove something, and significant 
actions imply some level of risk and therefore carry their 
own credibility factor. 41 
38, Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Towards A 
Theory of National Security (1952), 252. 
39. Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 18. 
40. Ibid., 18. 
41. Jervis, 19. 
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The role of signals in international relations is a 
complex one. They can be sent from honest actors as well as 
deceptive ones. 
Signals ... can be thought of as promissory notes. 
They do not contain inherent credibility. They 
do not, in absence of some sort of enforcement 
system, provide their own evidence that an actor 
will live up to them .... Signals do not alter 
the actors' capabilities and therefore do not 
direci~y affect the distribution of power among 
them. 
When these signals are sent the receiver has to analyze 
the intention of the signals. First the receiver must 
determine what the sender is trying to tell him. Second, 
the receiver must judge the validity of the sender's signal. 
That is, is the sender serious or is he only bluffing? 
These two levels of analysis are not always understood at 
the same time. Although one state may know what an actor is 
saying that state may not believe the actor will do as he 
43 
says. 
In regard to indices, the correlation between an index 
and the future behavior does not need be perfect, only high 
enough to predict the shape, nature or direction of the 
behavior. Indices are open to interpretation, and the 
sender cannot guarantee that the receiver understands the 
indices or what reference is being drawn from them. The 
receiver might view the theory behind the indices to be 
42. Ibid., 21. 
43. Ibid., 24-25. 
faulty and therefore conclusions drawn from them would also 
44 be wrong. 
Just how important are signals and indices in inter-
national relations? They can be very important both in 
dealings between states and in the adjudication of inter-
national disputes. International courts and arbitrators 
have often examined signals in order to judge disputes over 
45 territory between two or more states. They are also 
useful in analyzing the actions taken by the actors which 
were based upon their interpretation of the signals and the 
other actors intentions. 
Signals involved in the Falklands Crisis 
What signals, then, were exchanged between Argentina 
and the United Kingdom in the years leading up to the 2 
April 1982 invasion? The best starting point is the early 
1960's.46 Interest in the Falklands for the Argentine 
people was revived at this time. Official government 
activity was limited, however, to the creation of an annual 
44. Ibid., 26. 
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45. Michael P. Socarras, "The Argentine Invasion of the 
Falklands: International Norms of Signalling" in 
International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World 
Politics, ed. Reisman, Michael W. and Andrew R. Willard, 
115-143. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), note 
16, 115-116. 
46. This was the starting point for The Rt. Hon. The 
Lord Franks, Chairman of the Privy Council's Falkland 
Islands Review. This report is hereafter cited as Franks 
Report. 
'Malvinas Day' on 24 September 1964. 47 
The first official diplomatic exchanges were initiated 
in the United Nations. In the early 1960s Argentina raised 
the issue in the United Nations (UN) through the Special 
Committee on the implementation of the Declaration of the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
In reply to her demands for immediate decolonization the 
British representative declared that the British government 
would not conduct talks over the sovereignty of the islands 
but was willing to discuss the strengthening of peaceful 
relations between the United Kingdom, the Falklands and 
Argentina. Following The Special Committee report the 
General Assembly passed Resolution 2065, from which the 
United Kingdom abstained. This resolution called on the 
British and Argentinians to hold discussions with a view to 
finding a peaceful resolution to the dispute. 48 
The second round of diplomatic exchanges started in 
1966 when, then Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited 
Buenos Aires. The Foreign Secretary agreed to open dis-
cuss ion of the dispute and there was a preliminary meeting 
in London that July. During that meeting, "the Argentine 
Ambassador submitted a note formally claiming the 'res-
titution' of the Falkland Islands to Argentina. ,,49 The 
47. Franks Report. 4. 
48. Ibid., 4. 
49. Ibid., 5. 
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United Kingdom's response to this was that they did not 
recognize any Argentine claim to the islands but were 
prepared to discuss possible methods of decreasing the 
f · . b h t . th' 50 rlctl0n etween t e wo countrles over e lssue. 
Argentina was clearly signaling that they were still 
concerned over the British occupation of the islands. The 
British replied in keeping with the requirements of 
prescription by not accepting any other claim of sover-
eignty. This sent the signal back to Argentina that the 
United Kingdom was not prepared to hand the islands over to 
them. 
'Operation Condor' increased the scope of the dispute 
in September of 1966. Operation Condor was an unofficial 
signal to the British that the Falklands were vulnerable to 
military actions and that Argentina was well within striking 
distance for any type of military action. Operation Condor 
involved the hi-jacking of an Argentine Government DC-4 by 
about twenty armed Argentine civilians who ordered the plane 
to fly to Port Stanley. The Argentine government dis-
asociated itself from the action but several mass demon-
strations were organized in support of the action. The 
signal that the Argentine people, if not the government, was 
sending to the British was that there were some elements of 
the Argentine population that were committed to the Argen-




The British response to this clear signal ended up as a 
somewhat contradictory double signal. First in the immed-
iate aftermath of the incident the British government 
increased its Royal Marine detachment on the islands from 
one officer and five men to full platoon strength. Second, 
the British attempted to settle the dispute by suggesting a 
'sovereignty freeze' for thirty years after which the islan-
ders would be free to choose their own government. During 
this freeze no actions regarding any possible normalization 
of relations or trade would be regarded as affecting either 
52 party's claims. Argentina rejected this proposal. In 
response to this rejection the British government offered to 
cede its claim on the islands' sovereignty provided that the 
wishes of the islanders were respected. The talks were 
disrupted by the Falkland Islands Council which publicized 
(to all the Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom) the 
fact that the talks over sovereignty were underway. This 
move sparked a debate in the House and the British press. 
The Government was forced to reassure the House and the 
United Kingdom that the islanders' wishes would be first and 
53 foremost on their minds when negotiations took place. 
The British and Argentine governments were finally able 
52. Douglas Kinney. "Anglo-Argentine Diplomacy and the 
Falklands Crisis." in The Falklands War: Lessons for 
Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law. ed. Alberto R. 
ColI and Anthony Arend, 81-105. (Boston: G. Allen and Unwin 
Co., 1985), 82. and Franks Report, 5-6. 
53. Franks Report, 6. 
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to reach an agreement in 1968. A 'Memorandum of Under-
standing' which outlined the British official conditions for 
the cession of sovereignty: the islanders 'interests' 
54 instead of their 'wishes' were to be paramount. The 
signal that Argentina ultimately received following all of 
these incidents was that military or paramilitary activity 
could gain quick results that would weaken the British 
sovereignty claim. Alternatively the uproar in the House of 
Commons and in the British press signaled to Argentina that 
there was popular support in the United Kingdom for con-
tinuing British control of the islands. 55 
In the years following, talks continued and several 
accords were reached that linked the Falklands with the 
Argentine mainland. In 1971 it was announced that scholar-
ships would be provided for islanders who wished to study in 
Argentina, an airstrip was to be constructed, Argentine 
immigration documents were issued to the islanders, 
reciprocal exemptions from duties and taxes were agreed to 
and the islanders were promised exemption from Argentine 
'l't ,56 Th' t f h m~ ~ ary serv~ce. ~s se 0 agreements, owever, was 
soon followed by an impasse in the talks. Argentina refused 
to discuss any further linkages unless the British govern-
53. Franks Report, 6. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Socarras, 122-123. 
56. Ibid., 7. 
ment re-established talks on sovereignty. Argentina again 
raised the issue in the UN and in 1972 General Assembly 
resolution 3160 called for both governments to accelerate 
the talks on sovereignty.57 
The next signals that were exchanged were initiated in 
Argentina when the newspaper Cronica called for an invasion 
of the islands. This Argentine tabloid instituted a public 
subscription on 16 December 1975 for the financing of an 
invasion of the Falkland Islands. This was its second 
attempt to use the Falkland's dispute to increase circu-
lation and gain a greater share of the public market. The 
government of Argentina not only distanced itself from the 
campaign, but laid charges against the publisher. 58 Al-
73 
though the Argentinian government distanced itself from this 
press campaign the British Ambassador was instructed to warn 
the Argentine government that any military action on the 
59 islands would be met by force. The British response, 
then, to this unofficial signal was a reversal of previous 
signals and a clear warning that the British were prepared 
to respond to an armed attack on the islands. However, the 
British did not back this statement up with increased mil-
itary activity on the islands. British intelligence assess-
57. Ibid., 8. 
58. Guillermo Makin, "Argentine Approaches to the 
Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?" 
International Affairs (London). 59 (Summer 1983): 396. 
59. Franks Report, 8. 
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ments suggested that although Argentine military activity 
was possible, it was unlikely as long as the British govern-
ment was willing to keep the sovereignty negotiations 
60 
open. 
The next event that sent a signal to Argentina came 
about when the British, in 1975, commissioned Lord Shack-
leton to conduct a survey of the possible long-term economic 
potential of the Falkland Islands. This survey was insti-
gated because of British government fears over the decline 
of the islands' economy and population. The Argentine 
government responded very strongly to the survey and Argen-
tina's Foreign Minister warned that this was "rapidly moving 
towards a head-on collision ... [and that] his government 
could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous out-
come. 1061 The United Kingdom attempted to smooth over the 
incident but they met with bitter words from both the Argen-
tine government and press. 
Tensions increased in December 1975 when the Argentine 
government announced that RSS Shackleton (an unarmed British 
registered research ship engaged in an international scien-
tific mission unassociated with Lord Shackleton's survey) 
would be arrested if she entered Argentine waters. In Feb-
ruary of the next year the Argentine destroyer ARA Almirante 
60. Ibid. This assessment was often reaffirmed by the 
British intelligence community right up until 1982. Ibid., 
passim. 
61. Ibid., 10. 
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Storni fired shots at RSS Shackleton seventy eight miles 
62 
south of Port Stanley. British intelligence reported that 
the plan had been created by the Argentine Navy and not the 
Government of Isabel Peron and that the Commander of the 
Navy had ordered that the ship should not be sunk or anyone 
aboard the ship harmed. The signal that the Argentine mili-
tary was presenting to the British was that they were pre-
pared to use military means to speed the sovereignty nego-
tiations along. At the same time the military was also 
signaling that it did not want to escalate the military 
tensions beyond a certain point in fear that the Peron 
63 government would gain domestic popular support. 
The British signaled by their response that there was a 
limit to the British acquiescence. Clearly the attack on an 
unarmed scientific research vessel engaged in international 
research was too much for the British government to allow. 
The government indicated to the Argentinians their views 
through the decision to keep the ice patrol ship HMS Endur-
ance, which was initially scheduled to be retired, in 
service and the dispatching of a Royal Navy frigate to the 
64 
area. 
In contrast to the clear diplomatic and military sig-
62. Ibid., 11-12. Hastings and Jenkins reported that 
the Argentine Navy mistakenly thought that Lord Shackleton 
was on board the research vessel that was, "in fact, named 
after his father, 29. 
63. Franks Report, 12. 
64. Ibid., 12-13. 
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nals sent by the British during the Shackleton incident, the 
British response to the next international incident sent 
very different signals. On 20 December 1976 a helicopter 
from HMS Endurance discovered an Argentine military presence 
on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. The 
British government waited until 5 January 1977 to inquire as 
to their purpose and waited until the Argentine response on 
14 January 1977 before they formally protested. The protest 
that was lodged on 19 January 1977 declared that the Argen-
tine presence was a violation of British sovereignty over 
the islands. 65 This 'lag time' in protesting what must 
have been viewed in the United Kingdom as a clear violation 
of British sovereignty signaled to the Argentine government 
a diminished British resolve to hold the Falklands and the 
dependencies indefinitely. 
There are two other important signals that the British 
actions conveyed to the Argentinians during this incident. 
First, the British government failed to publicize the 
incident until 1978, thereby signaling that the area was not 
of any great importance to the government. 66 Finally the 
British government instead of sending a strong signal to the 
Argentine government initiated another round of talks on the 
possibility of cooperation in the area. This signaled that 
the British government could be intimidated into sovereignty 
65. Ibid., 14. 
66. Peter J. Beck, "Britain's Antarctic Dimension." 
International Affairs (London). 59 (Summer 1983): 431. 
67 talks. 
Britain's low-key response to the Thule occup-
tion,and its clear preference for negotiation, en-
ouraged Argentina to believe that the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies as a whole might be within 
its grasp, especially as the episode appeared to 
fit into an overall pattern of Briti5~ withdrawal 
from the South-west Atlantic region. 
With the election of the Thatcher government in 1979 
the United Kingdom re-assessed its position on the islands. 
The concept of leaseback was the only option that seemed to 
77 
suggest any possibility of an agreement. The proposal was a 
formal transfer of sovereignty to Argentina with some form 
of leaseback of administration. Although it was never form-
ally submitted to the Argentine government, this proposal 
offered the Argentinians the principal element, that of 
sovereignty and did hold some protection for the islanders' 
. ht 69 rJ.g s. 
This proposal met with hostility in the British House 
of Commons as several members from all sides of the House 
attacked the government's plans. As for the islanders, the 
Falkland Islands' Joint Councils responded to the proposal 
by issuing the following statement: 
While this House does not like any of the ideas 
put forward by [the British Government] for a 
possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute 
with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's 
Government should hold further talks with the 
67. Socarras, 128. 
68. Beck, "Antarctic Dimension", 431. 
69. "Falkland Islands: The Origins of a War." Economist 
19 June 1982, 36. 
Argentines at which this House should be repre-
sented and at which the British Delegation should 
seek an agreement to freeze the dispute oV7n 
sovereignty for a specific period of time. 
The signal that the government sent to Argentina at that 
time was that the government was prepared to open nego-
tiations on the subject of leaseback but that it met with 
78 
such widespread opposition within the British Parliament and 
ran contrary to the Islanders' wishes that the proposal was 
never formally submitted to the Republic of Argentina. The 
bottom line of this signal to Argentina was that as long as 
the Islanders were not happy with any proposed settlement 
then the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland would not be either. 
The following round of talks with Argentina in 1981 
ground to a halt due to several changes underway in both 
countries. In September, Mrs. Thatcher shuffled the junior 
minister in charge of the Falklands out of the Foreign 
Office. Then, in November, the moderates in the Falkland 
Islands council were replaced by hard liners who wanted 
absolutely nothing to do with the leaseback option. Fin-
ally, in Argentina, General Viola was replaced as head of 
the junta by General Galtieri. Because of these changes, 
the talks that were to start in December were postponed 
until February of 1982. 71 
A very important signal was received in Argentina by 
70. Quoted in Franks Report, 23. 
71. "Origins of the Falklands War", Economist, 37. 
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1981 however. On 30 June the British Parliament approved of 
the expiration of the commission of HMS Endurance, the only 
armed Royal Navy ship stationed in the area. In defending 
the decision Mrs. Thatcher argued that, "there are many 
competing claims on the defence budget [and the government] 
felt that other claims on the defence budget should have 
greater priority. ,,72 This statement, if not the act of 
removing HMS Endurance, signaled to Argentina that the 
Thatcher government was no longer interested in the area. 
The attacks on the decision came primarily from Lord 
Carrington, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Lord 
Shackleton. Lord Carrington opposed the withdrawal on the 
grounds that until the sovereignty dispute was settled it 
was important for the British Government to retain its 
normal presence in the area and at the current level; any 
reduction would be a clear signal to Argentina and the 
islanders that the British were less committed than before 
to defend the islands. 73 For Lord Shackleton the principle 
of flying the flag, the white ensign, was the most important 
one at stake. 74 
Other reactions to the removal of Endurance all sounded 
a common alarm, that this action weakened the British claim 
to sovereignty and signaled to the world that the United 
72. Hansard (Commons), Vol 17, cols. 856-857, 9 
February 1982. 
73. Franks Report, 33. 
74. Beck, "Antarctic Dimension", 432. 
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Kingdom no longer felt that the islands were important. The 
Falkland Islands Councils held another joint meeting upon 
hearing the news and warned the Thatcher government that it 
appeared to them that the British government was abandoning 
its defence of British interests at a time when opposing 
powers were strengthening theirs. They felt that the 
removal of the Endurance would reduce the British claim to 
sovereignty over the islands not only in the eyes of Argen-
tina but throughout the world. 75 
Further support for the islanders' claims came from 
Admiral Sir Edmund Irving who in the January 1982 Geo-
graphical Magazine wrote an article which claimed that, 
the islanders are having to face up to being 
deserted by Britain. This prospect is being 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of the important and 
traditional support of the Royal Navy, whose links 
with these distant lands h,g been maintained for 
longer than memory serves. 
The Admiral concluded the article with a warning that there 
was increased interest in the islands and the possible 
mineral wealth of the Antarctic and that it was a time to 
strengthen the British claim and presence in the area, not 
77 to decrease them. 
Lord Morris in a speech in the House of Lords commented 
that he saw the move as a relaxation of Britain's Falklands 
75. Franks Report, 33. 
76. Admiral Sir Edmund Irving, "Does Withdrawal of 
Endurance Signal a Falklands Islands Desertion?" 
Geographical Magazine 54 (January 1982): 3. 
77. Ibid., 4. 
vigil and that the news was being greeted with widespread 
approval in the Argentina press. 78 This factor was 
confirmed in the Franks Report which reported that the 
British Embassy in Argentina sent a note to the Foreign 
Office reporting that, "several Argentine newspapers had 
carried prominently reports of an article in The Daily 
Telegraph on the subject ... [and that] all the newspaper 
81 
articles high-lighted the theme that Britain was 'abandoning 
the protection of the Falklands,.,,79 
Coupled with the proposed removal of HMS Endurance came 
renewed pressure from the Argentine government for the 
sovereignty talks to resume. The Argentine Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issued a warning to the British that they 
desired a return to the negotiations in a realistic spirit 
and full certainty that the two sides could come to some 
formal understanding. It concluded that there was a 
national awareness of the dispute that allowed for nego-
tiations but does not wish to defer indefinitely a question 
th t t ' l' t 't d d' 't 80 a concerns na lona ln egrl y an 19n1 y. 
The British failure to respond to this warning and the 
planned reduction of the British presence in the area 
supported an Argentine belief that the British were willing 
to quit the Falklands. 81 
78. Beck, "Antarctic Dimension", 432. 
79. Franks Report, 33-34. 
80. Ibid., 28. 
81. Socarras, 131-132. 
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The final signals were exchanged immediately before the 
April invasion. 1982 started out on a strong note for 
normalization of relations between the two States with the 
elevation of General Galtieri to the Presidency of Argen-
tina. Galtieri represented, especially to the Americans, 
the acceptable form of authoritarian government. He showed 
an intention for a more humanitarian government and a desire 
to regain control of the economy. He wanted to contain the 
enormous inflation rate and to that end started to cut 
government spending including a real reduction of military 
spending. 82 Galtieri also represented a close ally 
to the United states due to his previous co-operation, while 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, with the Reagan Admin-
istration in aiding the Contra rebels. 
On the other hand, dual negative signals were also 
received in the months leading up to the April invasion. 
The first came in response to an unofficial landing of an 
Argentine scrap metal dealer (Senior Davidoff) on South 
Georgia in late December 1981 and the second during an 
Argentine press blitz concerning the possibility of an 
invasion of the islands. The first incident involved Sr. 
Davidoff and some of his men landing on South Georgia 
without authorization to inspect an abandoned whaling 
station. While Sr. Davidoff did have a contract for the 
purchase and removal of the equipment at the station he did 
82. "Origins of the Falklands War", Economist, 37. 
not have the proper papers needed to land on British 
territory. On 16 December 1981 he and several of his men 
travelled to South Georgia aboard the Argentine Navy 
icebreaker ARA Almiranti Irizar. He did send a letter 
advising the governor of the islands of his trip but it 
arrived after he had departed. 83 
On 31 December 1981 the British Governor of the 
Falkland Islands notified the Foreign Office that the 
Argentine party had violated British laws by failing to 
obtain clearance to land on the island. The British 
government informed the Governor that he should take no 
action that would risk provoking the situation any 
further. 84 The British delayed in protesting the situation 
83 
to the Argentine government until 9 February 1982, a protest 
the Argentine government rejected nine days later. 8S 
On 20 March the Governor reported that more Argentine 
civilians and what appeared to be military personnel aboard 
the ARA Bahia Buen Suceso had landed on South Georgia, fired 
shots, defaced signs prohibiting unauthorized landings and 
raised the Argentine flag. The British government's 
response to this violation of sovereignty was to dispatch 
HMS Endurance and roughly half of the Royal Marines 
stationed on the Falkland Islands to South Georgia with 




orders to remove the Argentine citizens. Tensions were 
decreased temporarily when it was reported that the landing 
contained no Argentine military personnel and that it had 
departed from South Georgia. It was later reported to 
London that although most of the Argentine citizens had left 
South Georgia some still remained. In addition to this, on 
25 March the British were told that three Argentine warships 
had been dispatched to prevent HMS Endurance from removing 
the landing party. Upon the arrival of these ships HMS 
Endurance, finding herself outnumbered and outgunned, 
retired from the area. 86 
Further evidence was reported to the British government 
that the party had still not departed and that an additional 
vessel which was first though to be an unarmed civilian ship 
had delivered landing craft and a helicopter to the 
Argentine party. On the 26th the Argentine Foreign Minister 
announced that the Argentine government would protect the 
S th G . 87 men on ou eorg~a. Clearly the Argentine government 
did not feel that the British would respond to any overt 
military threat to the islands. The British decision only 
temporarily to extend the commission of HMS Endurance in 
March 1982 in response to the South Georgia incident clearly 
supports this view. aa The Franks Report concluded that 
86. Ibid., 49-50 
87. Ibid., 50-60, passim. 
88. Socarras, 134. 
although the Argentine government had not instigated the 
incident it was now prepared to escalate the crisis. 89 
Even if Galtieri had wanted to shift the focus away 
from any possible Argentine military move on the islands 
before the February talks in New York the Argentine press 
focused on the problem. La Prensa predicted that the new 
85 
Argentine government was going to present the United Kingdom 
with several conditions for the continuance of negotiations 
and if these were not met then all talks would be broken 
off. The paper linked this with the new regime's policy 
towards the Beagle Channel dispute and stated that the 
government was initiating a bold and ambitious plan to give 
Argentina a relevant role in the South Atlantic. The 
newspaper concluded that the United States would support 
Argentina in its disputes and that the possibility of 
military action could not be discounted especially since the 
principle of sovereignty was at stake. 90 The Buenos Aires 
Herald on 9 February 1982 reported the new regime's 
willingness to use force to recover the Falklands and Beagle 
Channel Islands. It outlined the pros and cons of any 
invasion attempt and concluded that unless the dispute was 
resolved quickly and peacefully, then it would have to be 
91 
resolved by force. 
89. Franks Report, 86. 
90. Ibid., 37-38. 
91. Ibid., 38. 
86 
These reports were questioned by the British Embassy, 
but the newspapers claimed to be only expressing independent 
editorial comments and not official government policy. The 
British, through intelligence reports compiled in February 
and early March, concluded that these were not independent 
editorials but rather a concerted effort by the Foreign 
Ministry to put pressure on the British before the New York 
92 talks. To back up this threat of an invasion, Argentina 
landed an Argentine Air Force C-130 Hercules at Port Stanley 
in mid March. The Hercules made the landing allegedly due 
to an emergency but some Buenos Aires observers said it was 
planned and that it was testing the airstrip's capacity for 
93 landing troops. Argentina clearly wanted to signal to the 
British that they meant to resolve the dispute quickly and 
did not want just another round of talks. This incident was 
a clear signal to the British that if the peaceful nego-
tiations failed to resolve the dispute then military means 
would be considered 'officially'. 
The signals that were exchanged due to the talks seemed 
to offer hope that the dispute could be settled in the near 
future. Initially the Argentine representative Sr. Ros com-
plained about British 'foot-dragging'. The Argentine pos-
ition was that it wanted movement on the leaseback idea and 
the implementation of monthly meetings to work towards a 
92. Ibid., 38. 
93. Makin, "Argentine Approaches," 401. 
87 
settlement, a fixed agenda in which sovereignty would be 
included, and a deadline at the end of the year. The nego-
tiations were able to work out a compromise which called for 
a 'negotiating committee' to meet at regular (but unspec-
ified) intervals, an open agenda and a commitment to attempt 
to reach a settlement within a year. Both parties came out 
of the negotiations pleased about the progress made and both 
labeled the talks' atmosphere as 'positive and cordial,.94 
These signals were positive ones and suggested that both 
sides were willing to settle the dispute in a reasonable 
amount of time and through negotiations. 
What emerged from these two decades of signaling were 
several changes in the British position. First their negot-
iating stance had steadily narrowed. Second, the British 
were stalling and the Argentine government knew that the 
British were stalling. Finally, the Argentine government 
saw repeated military actions make large gains while the 
diplomatic attempts resulted only in British stalling 
t t · 95 ac 1CS. The Thatcher government signaled a lack of 
political will to solve the problem or conversely commitment 
to spending the amount fully required to protect the islands 
from hostile action. 96 British willingness to keep the 
94. "The Origins of a War." Economist, 37. 
95, William Wallace, "How Frank was Franks?" 
International Affairs (London). 59 (Summer 1983): 455. 
96. Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland 
Islands." Foreign Affairs. 61 (Fall 1982): 198. 
88 
negotiations going while taking no measures to increase 
their military presence in the area gave the Argentine junta 
a signal that any quick and decisive action to retake the 
islands would be considered fait accompli by the British. 
The British also appear to have fumbled their response 
to the South Georgia incident. The British did not wish to 
send any additional surface ships into the area in case it 
signaled 'sabre rattling'. In light of the Argentine 
assessment that the British would not respond in kind to a 
military action this 'sabre rattle' might have stopped the 
final order to invade from being issued. 97 Such 'sabre 
rattling' might have been a strong indicator to the Argen-
tine military junta that the United Kingdom was willing to 
back up its diplomatic protests and that no military action 
against the islands would be tolerated. 
Conclusion 
Why did the Argentine junta miscalculate the British 
reaction to the military occupation of the Falkland Islands? 
What role did these signals play in the final decision to 
invade the islands for the Argentine government and for the 
British in deciding to respond by dispatching the naval task 
force? In his article Socarras argues that the conflict was 
caused because one or both parties misinterpreted its 
97. Phil Williams, "Miscalculations, Crisis Management 
and the Falklands Conflict." The World Today 39 (April 
1983): 145. 
signals that it had been sending. In short, the Argentine 
position is that since 1965 the British had sent signals 
that they were not serious in their claims to sovereignty 
over the islands and were prepared to relinquish those 
claims given increased Argentine displays of sovereignty 
over the islands. 98 As for the junta's explanation of its 
the miscalculation of the British response, Galtieri 
publicly stated that a military reaction by the British was 
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not expected and that if any did occur it was expected to be 
low key and only designed to spur a return to negotiations. 
He stated that although the possibility of British 
retaliation remained the junta did not believe it to be 
probable that the British would mobilize over the Falklands. 
According to Galtieri he felt it was 'scarcely possible and 
totally improbable,.99 
Several other events worked to reinforce Galtieri's 
conviction that the British would not react to an Argentine 
move on the islands. The situation looked as if nothing 
could go wrong for the junta in its campaign to regain the 
islands. The aftermath that Galtieri and the junta foresaw 
was that the world would accept the recapture of the Falk-
lands as an accomplished fact. The pro-Argentina United 
States Administration, reflecting the increased friendship 
between Reagan and Galtieri and previous Argentine assis-
98. Socarras, 118-119. 
99. Moneta, 319. 
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tance to the Contra rebels, would at worst issue a weak 
protest. The Soviet Union and the Third World countries 
would applaud the junta's aggressive attack on colonialism. 
The United Kingdom would not have the military or economic 
power to put up more than a formal protest. And most 
importantly, at home the people would put aside their 
displeasure with the junta's economic mismanagement and 
human rights violations and rally around the leader who 
t d th F lkl d t A t ' 100 re urne e a an sorgen Ina. 
Galtieri also saw his friendly relationship with the 
United States as more important in determining American 
interests in the conflict than the United States' relation-
ship with its NATO ally, the United Kingdom. He concluded 
that his friendship and the Monroe Doctrine would sway the 
American government to back Argentina in any dispute with 
the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic. Galtieri had 
dropped hints of his intentions to the Americans and was 
given assurances by the United States that they would pursue 
a non-intervention policy towards Argentina and the Falk-
101 lands. This friendly relationship between Buenos 
Aires and Washington had been initiated in 1981 when General 
Galtieri, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, made several 
visits to Washington to meet with President Reagan. Argen-
tina had supplied the Contra rebels with advisors and this 
100. "Jaw-jaw Continues as War-war Approaches." 
Economist, 22. 
101. Eddy and Linklater, 65. 
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the Argentine junta felt secured American acquiescence in an 
aggressive Argentine Falklands policy.102 The Americans 
attempted to pursue such a policy and through the Secretary 
of State, Alexander Haig, sought a diplomatic solution. It 
was not until 30 March 1982 that the United States formally 
announced its support of its NATO ally, the United Kingdom. 
Galtieri read the British signals as assurances that 
they would not oppose any Argentine definitive move in 
regard to the islands. The most important signal that the 
British sent to the Argentine junta was during the South 
Georgia incident that immediately preceded the invasion. 
During this incident the British responded with only a token 
military force, which was quickly outgunned by the Argentine 
naval forces in the region. Thatcher was criticized for not 
responding in a more forceful manner. Had the British sent 
a stronger naval force to remove Sr. Davidoff and his men 
the Argentine junta would have received a signal that told 
them that the British were not prepared to surrender the 
islands. This signal was never sent and in its place the 
British signaled that they would only expend the military 
forces located on the islands in the defence of those 
islands. Given this information, Galtieri concluded that 
the invasion of the Falklands was the best and least costly 
method of diverting public pressure from domestic problems. 
For Galtieri it was the only way which he could hope to gain 
102. Gavshon and Rice, 17, and Franks Report, 75-76. 
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public support for his Presidency when his military power 
ran out. 
The literature that emerged in Argentina after the 
conflict says that the popular opinion immediately after the 
invasion was that the United Kingdom could and would not 
respond with the Royal Navy. Most of the Argentine con-
script soldiers, it was reported, believed that the diplo-
matic crisis would be settled even before they were 
stationed on the islands. The geographic realities alone, 
many claimed, would dissuade the British from responding. 
Even if the British could respond to the conflict many of 
the Argentine authors could not understand the reason for 
the British response. Most Argentinians accepted the 
historical justification of the Argentine action and 
therefore could not see how the British could justify their 
military reaction. The Argentinians looked at recent 
British decisions to allow decolonization of its other 
possessions. Why, then, would they overreact to the 
occupation of the Falklands, a group of small, under-
populated islands far from the British Isles?103 
The British counter the Argentine assessment by stating 
that Argentina might have been correct in reading the United 
Kingdom's lack of resolve over the sovereignty issue but it 
went too far when it assumed that the United Kingdom would 
103. Simon Collier, "The First Falklands War? Argentine 
Attitudes," International Affairs (London) 59 (Summer 1983): 
461-462. 
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allow itself to be embarrassed by an Argentine military 
invasion of the islands. Britain might also claim that the 
Argentinians were acting purely out of domestic concerns and 
that the decision was not based on any signal sent by the 
United Kingdom or received by the Republic of Argentina. 
Even if this is true the Argentine military junta had to 
evaluate the United Kingdom's willingness to accept the 
invasion. For any rational decision-making process the 
international signals had to be evaluated. 104 Argentina was 
unlikely to instigate a military campaign that it felt it 
could not win. 
Further evidence to support the notion that Galtieri 
did not expect a British military response stems from the 
fact that if he had waited longer the Royal Navy would have 
been much less capable of sending an effective task force. 
Philip Windsor suggests that Galtieri had only to wait two 
years until the Royal Navy was depleted of all ability to 
respond to an attack on the Falklands. 10S The 1981 Defence 
review, in addition to advocating the removal of HMS 
Endurance, also advocated the sale of HMS Invincible, one of 
the two remaining small anti-submarine warfare carriers in 
106 the Royal Navy. It also proposed the scrapping of HMS 
Hermes the other carrier. 107 Windsor suggests that the 
104. Socarras, 119-120. 
lOS. Philip Windsor, "Diplomatic Dimensions of the 
Falklands Crisis," Millennium 12 (Spring 1983): 89-90. 
106. Franks Report, 77. 
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Argentine government could have waited at least until Easter 
when the Royal Navy, for no other reason but to demonstrate 
that it can, goes around the world. Much of the British 
naval power would have been positioned in the Indian Ocean 
at that time and would not have been able to, or at least, 
would have found it much harder to reorganize and send a 
task force before world attention shifted away from the 
A t ' ,108 rgen Ine aggressIon. 
107. Calvert, The Rights and Wrongs, 85. 
108. Windsor, 89-90. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 
Introduction 
The Falkland Islands War of 1982 presented an example 
of modern warfare between developed and developing states. 
The nature of warfare between these two types of states has 
changed dramatically since Hillaire Belloc coined the ditty, 
"Whatever happens/We have got/The Maxim Gun/And they have 
not,,1 The nature of modern warfare has not only been 
changed in regards to the weapons and technologies used by 
both sides but in regards to the strategic aspects of the 
conflicts, the operations and tactics used by both belli-
gerent states, as well as the increased logistical burden 
imposed by modern conflicts. This change has occurred in 
all aspects of modern warfare in land battles, naval engage-
ments and air warfare. 
Carl von Clausewitz outlined an approach to the study 
of warfare in his book On War. In this he suggested that 
wars needed to be examined in their component parts, strat-
egy, operations, tactics and logistics. Although no one 
aspect of warfare can be forever isolated from the others, 
Clausewitz suggests that each study must begin with the 
1. Quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern 
War in the Third World." International Security (Spring 
1986): 145. 
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examination of the strategic aspects of the conflict. It is 
only then that an analysis of operations, tactics and log-
istics can be incorporated into the study. It must be 
remembered, however that none of these individual sectors 
can be examined without some reference to the others, and 
that they must be thought of as a whole rather than as 
2 individual parts. 
Eliot Cohen's article "Distant Battles" in Inter-
national Security Spring 1986 offers a good approach to the 
study of modern Third World conflict. This article 
approaches the subject of warfare in the same manner as 
Clausewitz examining its component parts but never forget-
ting the holistic nature of warfare. Cohen updates Clause-
witze's study of warfare and introduces new factors that are 
fundamental to modern warfare between Third and First World 
states. 
Strategy 
Theories on the Nature of Modern strategy 
As war is an extension of politics, it seems only nat-
ural to start with an examination of the political aspects 
of warfare before any comparison of weapons, weapon systems, 
composition of armed forces, performance of the militaries 
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976),75. 
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and the effectiveness of logistical support is undertaken. 
Eliot Cohen suggests that there are common characteristics 
in modern Third World warfare. Cohen asserts that the most 
important characteristic of these wars is that they are all 
post-colonial or even post-post-colonial. In this he means 
that they have not involved an ex-colonial power engaging a 
national liberation movement, or an ex-colonial power coming 
to the aid of its old colony against a new rival. Nor have 
these conflicts been between a European power and a newly 
independent state over the immediate legacy of colonial 
rule, or a continuation of a colonial war of independence, 
or a civil war within a newly independent state. 3 
Cohen states that these modern Third World conflicts 
are taking place between states that have demonstrated their 
independence for several decades. These conflicts are 
usually regional in nature and if they do involve an ex-
colonial state the disparity between the two states' mili-
tary power has decreased significantly, and it can no longer 
be assumed to be a 'walk over' for the European state. In 
addition, the leaders of these belligerent states come from 
the post-colonial generation. That is, the leaders are no 
longer those whose first political successes came by leading 
the struggle for independence. 4 
Further to this emergence of a post-colonial world 
3. Cohen, 145. 
4. Ibid., 145 
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order is the fact that the purposes for warfare have changed 
dramatically for Third World states. The ultimate defeat of 
the colonial empire is not the principal impetus for war. 
Instead of the collective anti-colonial conflicts, Third 
World states are engaged in regional long-term antagonisms 
against other Third World states or regional actors. The 
nature of the political interaction between these states is 
similar to that between Europeans at the turn of the Cen-
tury, with increased tension, suspicion and preparation for 
war, a perpetual search for allies and constant manoeuvering 
5 for advantage. 
The second major characteristic of modern Third World 
warfare concerns the fact that independent states and not 
guerrilla movements are the principal actors and as such 
tend to bring other states into the conflict as allies. 
Cohen suggests that most recent wars have been coalition 
wars. Not only do the Third World combatants bring regional 
powers, who may have a vested interest or even a secondary 
motive, such as another dispute with the opposing state, 
into the conflict but they are effective in exploiting the 
superpower rivalry to gain economic and political support 
6 from one or the other superpower. 
These coalition wars tend to drag out over long periods 
of time and often come to inconclusive ends. They continue 
5. Ibid., 146. 
6. Ibid., 146-147. 
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because the military capabilities of the opposing forces are 
often underestimated, or one's own military capabilities are 
overestimated. Further, the initial success of one com-
batant might bring another party into the conflict in order 
to counter any advantage that would have negative effects on 
the third country, These wars take on the patterns of eigh-
teenth-century European warfare, with short periods of vio-
lent fighting separated by long periods of uneasy truces 
where both sides attempted to regroup and rebuild alliances 
as well as their military capabilities,7 
The final strategic characteristic that Cohen 
identifies with modern Third World warfare is the advantages 
Third World leaders have over First World leaders in conduc-
ting these wars. Third World leaders can concentrate on a 
specific area of concern between states and can devote a 
greater amount of time to particular strategic concerns. 
They know who they might be fighting and can concentrate 
their energies on opposing them. They can prepare their 
military to fight a particular war against a particular 
enemy. First World powers do not have this advantage be-
cause they have much wider strategic concerns and cannot be 
guaranteed to have anticipated every possible conflict or 
every possible enemy.8 
In addition, Third World leaders have the ability to 
7. Ibid, 148. 
8. Ibid., 148. 
escalate tensions and use 'brinkmanship' in their everyday 
conduct of international affairs. Because of the regional-
ization of these disputes, the Third World leaders do not 
have to concern themselves with the consequences of ini-
tiating a conflict that could escalate into a superpower 
confrontation and a global nuclear war. This is not to say 
that regional disputes may not eventually lead to a super-
power confrontation but rather that the Third World leaders 
do not have to balance their regional goals with a global 
defence strategy. In addition to this Third World leaders 
usually have a centralized decision-making apparatus which 
allows one man or, at least, a small group to initiate far-
reaching and provocative measures against a possible oppon-
ent with a minimal amount of popular consensus. 9 
Application to the Falklands 
Cohen lists the Falklands War of 1982 as an example of 
modern warfare in the Third World. Although most of his 
characteristics fit the more recent conflicts in the Third 
World, like the Iran/Iraq War, the War in Lebanon and the 
Sino-Vietnamese War, it is harder to connect the Falklands 
conflict with his first characteristic, a post-colonial 
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context. Cohen argues that the Falklands conflict was not a 
colonial war, even though the Argentine junta suggested that 
Britain was conducting a colonial war and that Argentina was 
9. Ibid., 149. 
fighting a war of national liberation. 10 
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It is hard to see 
how an Argentine military invasion of islands occupied main-
ly by British citizens can be an act of national liberation. 
Cohen's greatest mistake is his failure to mention that the 
conflict has its roots in the colonial period and colonial 
actions. In 1766 when the British established their first 
settlement and in 1833 when they re-occupied the islands 
they were acting under colonial strategic principles. The 
islands today have lost most of the strategic importance 
that was fundamental to British colonialism of the nine-
teenth century. This is not to suggest that other aspects 
of the Falklands War do not fit Cohen's characteristics or 
even his theories on the nature of modern Third World war-
fare, only that the Falklands War reaches back into the 
colonial era for its beginnings. 
The use of alliances, Cohen's second major character-
istic, fits well into the nature of the Falklands War. Both 
sides looked to their existing alliance partners for assis-
tance in this conflict. The British looked towards the 
United States, their European Common Market partners and the 
Commonwealth countries for various levels of support. The 
British looked to the United States for intelligence, lim-
ited logistical support (transportation, in-flight refueling 
of Vulcan Bombers, supplying fuel to the US/British base at 
Ascension island) and for the increased deployment of 
10. Ibid., 145. 
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American troops in Europe to replace the British units temp-
orarily withdrawn from their NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) deployments. 11 
As for the members of the European Community the 
British looked to them for diplomatic support. They also 
asked and received from European Common Market the imple-
mentation of a economic sanctions against Argentina. Dip-
lomatic support was also extended by several of the Common-
wealth countries, many of which joined several European 
countries in voting with the United Kingdom in the UN 
(United Nations) General Assembly and severing diplomatic 
and military ties with Argentina. To this end the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Francis pym announced in the 
House of Commons on 7 April 1982 that, 
Our friends in Europe and the United States were 
among the very first [to condemn the Argentine 
aggression]. New Zealand has severed diplomatic 
relations with Argentina. Canada has placed an 
immediate ban on military supplies. Canada and 
Australia have withdrawn their Ambassadors from 
Buenos Aires. The Netherlands, France, Belgium 
and [the Federal Repu£~ic of] Germany have taken 
action on arms sales. 
While Argentina sought support from the Organization of 
American States (OAS) in general and the United States in 
particular, as well as, some limited support from the Soviet 
11. Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The 
Malvinas and the End of Military Rule trans. Ralph Johnstone 
(London: Verso Editions, 1984), 116. 
12. U.K. The Falklands Campaign: a Digest of Debates in 
the House of Commons 2 April to 15 June 1982. (Commons). 
(1982), 28-29. first addition mine, second in text. 
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Union. Argentina received at least diplomatic support from 
most of the OAS states except for the united States, which 
initially tried to remain neutral but eventually backed the 
British and Chile which, as outlined earlier, had a similar 
dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel Islands. As 
for the Soviet Union, it backed the Argentine cause in the 
war but, as demonstrated by its abstention from the UN reso-
lution condemning the use of force, was unwilling to become 
t ' t" t 13 an ac lve par lClpan . 
Cohen also suggests that Third World leaders hold a 
strategic advantage over their First World counterparts. 
The Third World leader can identify probable adversaries and 
can prepare his/her military to fight one or two possible 
enemies. For the First World leader this may not be as 
clear cut. Not only did Margaret Thatcher have to keep her 
foreign policy in line with the NATO alliance, but she also 
had to deal with Commonwealth policies, as well as the 
colonies like the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, 
etc. Clearly Argentina could concentrate on the United 
Kingdom as one of two possible future opponents. As for the 
United Kingdom it is unlikely that they could have focused 
on Argentina as a possible opponent given that they had 
several other more probable international conflicts or 
crises to deal with. Further, the British must seriously 
have doubted that a conflict could have emerged between the 
13. Dabat and Lorenzano, 117-118. 
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two countries or they would not have sold military equipment 
to Argentina in the past. 
In addition to this, Cohen asserts that it is much 
easier for a Third World leader to take an aggressive stand 
on a particular issue. A Third World leader does not have 
to balance his regional concerns with global security or the 
threat of nuclear war. In this instance it is clear that 
Galtieri had only one or two other possible areas or direc-
tions he could have moved to achieve his political goal. As 
for the British, the government in designing its foreign and 
military policy had to incorporate its NATO commitment, its 
own nuclear missile force and the commitment it has given to 
the colonies that it governs. 
Operations and Tactics 
The second element of warfare that Clausewitz examines 
in his study of warfare is operations and tactics. Strat-
egy might prepare a country to fight a certain war but 
operations and tactics prepare the military on how it will 
fight those wars. Cohen defines operations as, "actions by 
large formations and combined service operations. ,,14 
Operations and tactics deal not with who the armed forces 
will fight but how they will fight them. 
Theories on the Nature of Modern 
14. Cohen, 150. 
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Operations and Tactics 
In any discussion of operations and tactics it is 
necessary to distinguish between land, air and sea warfare. 
There is a near-universal division of armed forces into the 
three separate services (even Canada divides operational 
command between Mobile, Maritime and Air Commands). In 
modern Third World conflict land warfare has emerged as the 
dominant type almost to the exclusion of air and sea war-
fare. It might seem logical that this is the case, as it is 
armies that can best occupy capitals, subdue and police a 
t . 15 err1tory. Tanks and troops prove to be more effective in 
this secondary role than airplanes and ships. 
This relatively simple reason for the predominance of 
land warfare seems not to hold all of the answers, however. 
Are there other reasons why air and sea warfare have not 
played a greater role in modern Third World conflicts? 
Cohen rejects the traditional assumption that Third World 
militaries do not have the technological knowledge needed to 
conduct naval and air operations. He feels that this is 
simply not the case and that the primary reason is that air 
and naval power are difficult to incorporate into limited 
wars with specific political objectives. Air and sea power 
is best used in wars with total objectives, where blockades, 
large-scale amphibious landings and attacks on the enemy's 
economic infrastructure combine to achieve final victory. 
15. Ibid. 
In wars with more limited objectives, like the capturing of 
small pieces of territory, air and sea power are used to 
compliment land power. 16 
The nature of sea and air warfare limits their use by 
modern Third World states. Naval battles have not been 
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particularly numerous in Third World conflicts. This can be 
reasoned by an examination of the highly centralized nature 
of sea warfare. As opposed to land operations where there 
are a great number of units, sea warfare uses a relatively 
small number of very expensive units. The cost of losing 
the battle can be very high in sea warfare. Although the 
cost of losing a land battle might also be high, it is 
unlikely that the opponent does not also suffer heavy 
losses, while in a naval engagement the ratio of losses can 
very easily be lopsided. Third World fleets are composed of 
a small number of vessels and not many admirals are willing 
to risk the loss of the navy in major engagements. Rather, 
Cohen suggests, admirals prefer to use their units in 
guerrilla warfare conducted by smaller craft or submar-
. 17 Ines. 
Cohen adds four other considerations that limit the use 
of naval power in modern Third World conflicts. The first 
is that if the battle is conducted in international waters 
then the combatants risk offending the great maritime 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 150-151. 
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powers, such as the United States, which have vested inter-
ests in the free flow of international shipping. Second, 
most Third World states have not been able to develop 
adequate naval air cover. This is expensive and requires 
either a costly aircraft carrier or strategically located 
land bases. Third, long-range or prolonged naval operations 
require a logistical ability that most third world states do 
not possess. Finally, the ability of a small navy to pro-
tect itself in well-defended harbours or by leaving the 
immediate theater of operations and taking up station close 
by, allow it to retain some impact on the nature of the 
conflict. 18 That is, Third World leaders can use their 
naval power to act as a deterrent against any escalation of 
the conflict from its limited scope to a total war. Clearly 
if the warfare escalates to total war the admirals would not 
hesitate to throw in their navy and risk a major naval 
engagement. 
Cohen suggests that air campaigns can only be effective 
if one or two conditions prevail, first if the air power is 
concentrated against one or two target systems and second if 
the air power can gain undisputed air superiority. Third 
World states can very rarely accomplish either of these con-
ditions. This is not to say that the pilots do not possess 
the required skill or intelligence for such operations but 
that the support organizations for the air forces may lack 
18. Ibid., 152. 
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either the maintenance skill or spare part stockpiles to 
sustain the required prolonged combat. Air power, like 
naval power, requires a small number of units and no air 
force commander can sustain even the low rates of attrition 
that these campaigns might impose. Finally, the command 
structure of most air forces does not allow for the concen-
trated efforts needed in these campaigns. Air power is also 
needed for ground support operations and as the land forces 
are dominant in the modern Third World warfare the air force 
is used primarily as a support service for the ground 
19 troops. 
Having explained the reasons the limited role of the 
sea and air sectors of modern Third World armed forces, 
Cohen suggests four principal trends in operations for the 
land sector. The first is a surprise, set-piece but limited 
attack. He lists the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the Iraqi 
invasion of Iran, The Argentine invasion of the Falklands, 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1971 as examples of this trend. Instead of attempting a full 
invasion of the opponent's territory, the state targets 
small sections of it. Once the objectives are taken the 
invader will 'dig in' in the hope that a counter attack will 
be unable to dislodge it. This move is tactically sound 
since in modern land warfare the tactical defence is a much 
stronger use of military power. 20 
19. Ibid., 152-154. 
20. Ibid., 155. 
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Cohen suggests that after this initial offensive vic-
tory, the aggressor will adopt the second policy in this 
type of warfare, that of attrition. Once the strategic piece 
of territory has been secured the two sides will settle down 
into a protracted war of attrition as each side launches 
limited attacks which the invader hopes will quickly deplete 
the opponent's power and lead to a favourable conclusion to 
the dispute. Given the economic condition of most Third 
World counties it is unlikely that these wars could continue 
for very long. If these wars do continue what will happen 
will be either a simple collapse of both states or a major 
regime change in one of them, as opposed to the complete 
occupation of one state by another. 21 
Since wars of attrition can produce long periods of 
relative stalemate, Cohen suggests that states will attempt 
to find alternative or radically new weapons or tactics. 
Cohen suggests that the third trend in modern Third World 
warfare would be the adoption of unconventional means of 
warfare as a supplement rather than an alternative to 
conventional battles. The range of unconventional warfare 
falls between the use of insurgent forces to the use of 
chemical and nuclear weapons. Although no nuclear weapons 
have been used to date, it is impossible to project whether 
they will playa dominant role in the future. Cohen sug-
gests that as past conflicts between nuclear and non-nuclear 
21. Ibid., 156. 
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states have not raised the nuclear threat, such weapons may 
not have a role in the limited wars of the Third World 
states. He feels that the Iraqi use of chemical weapons 
demonstrates that the threat to the Third World from these 
22 
weapons is greater than that from nuclear weapons. Unless 
the nuclear power is capable of launching tactical nuclear 
weapons it seems unlikely that it would be willing to use 
nuclear weapons that might in the long term harm its own 
population. 
Finally, Cohen illustrates a fourth trend in opera-
tions, the urbanization of warfare. This trend is brought 
about again by the limited nature of the conflicts. Instead 
of searching for an opponent's military force, as advocated 
by Clausewitz, the invading land units seek to control a 
strategic piece of territory, which usually includes a city. 
By securing itself in a major city the invading army, espec-
ially if it is technologically inferior, can using simple 
anti-tank rockets and heavy machine gun fire to inflict 
heavy damage to a larger or more mechanized opponent. 23 
Application to the Falklands 
The war in the Falklands, as do all wars, has its own 
specific characteristics that are not easily slotted into 
general trends of any method of warfare. Although it will 
22. Ibid., 156-157. 
23. Ibid., 157-158. 
111 
be impossible to find perfect examples of Cohen's theories 
in the Falklands War, this is not to say that the general 
characteristics do not apply. Cohen suggests that naval and 
air operations are not conducted by Third World states, 
which might seem to be a direct contradiction to the Falk-
lands War. It is necessary, however to examine the effect-
iveness of the Argentine Navy and Air Force to determine if 
in fact they were valuable to the war effort. 
The Argentine Navy was clearly outmatched by the Royal 
Navy in the conflict. The Argentine Navy consisted of 
thirty six thousand men, four older diesel/electric sub-
marines, one eX-British Colossus aircraft carrier which was 
originally launched in 1943, one light cruiser, nine des-
troyers, six corvettes, six patrol ships, one large patrol 
vessel, eight fast attack craft, six coastal mine-sweepers, 
several assorted types of landing craft, one fourteen 
thousand-ton fleet tanker, one fleet support ship and one 
t t h · 24 ranspor s 1p. In contrast, the Royal Navy task 
force included sixty two surface warships and six sub-
marines, five of which were nuclear-powered. This task 
force included two anti-submarine warfare carriers, assault 
ships, destroyers, frigates, one offshore patrol ship, 
24. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Military Balance: 1982-1983 (London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 99. and Jozef 
Goldblat and Victor Millan, "The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict 
- A Spur to Arms Build-ups" in World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1983 (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd, 
1983), 476. 
counter-mine ships, one ice patrol ship, survey ships, one 
mooring and salvage vessel, one tug, tankers, replenishment 
ships, one stores support ship, and landing ships.25 
The naval aspects of the Falklands War can be best 
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explained using the four aspects of modern Third World naval 
operations outlined by Cohen. The first was that if the 
operation spilled into international waters the great mari-
time powers would playa more active part. Although the 
United States did not get directly involved in the conflict 
it is probably because the international shipping in the 
region is limited and that one of the combatants was the 
United Kingdom which also has a history of defending inter-
national shipping. If the conflict had involved two Third 
World navies and was threatening a more important seaway, 
then it is probable that the Americans would have had a much 
larger role. 26 
Cohen's second assumption was that the naval air arm of 
most Third World navies was not adequate to protect its 
fleets during active duty. Cohen suggested that this was 
because Third World countries lack large aircraft carriers 
or land bases strategically close to the action. Although 
the Argentine Navy had a large aircraft carrier, the 25th of 
25. Goldblat and Millan, 476. 
26. This increased American presence was witnessed 
during the U.S. Navy escort operations of the re-flagged 
Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88. During 
the same period the United Kingdom demonstrated its 
commitment by deploying Royal Navy ships in the region to 
protect international shipping. 
113 
May, it was confined to its home waters after the sinking of 
the General Belgrano. This was a wise decision on the part 
of the Argentine Fleet Admiral because the Argentine Navy 
did not possess enough units to provide adequate protection 
for the carrier. Although the Falklands are only roughly 
four hundred miles from Argentine land bases the Royal Navy 
task force, for the majority of its time during the con-
flict, was kept near the outer combat range of the Argentine 
fighter-planes. 27 
As for Cohen's third point, that the problems asso-
ciated with logistics when operating a navy at sea and in 
combat prevented the Argentine Fleet from conducting opera-
tions far from its horne waters. This is supported by the 
fact that the Argentine Fleet rarely left port after the 
sinking of the General Belgrano. The problems associated 
with maintaining a fleet of ships of various origins, ages 
and capabilities prevented the Argentine Navy from engaging 
the Royal Navy in a surface battle. These ships were 
foreign-built and many were equipped with out-of-date weapon 
systems no longer being produced and whose supply of spare 
parts was limited at best. The resulting logistical prob-
lems can be resolved if the Navy is willing to spend enough, 
or can find a supplier willing to sell, but the necessary 
funds are unlikely to be forthcoming to an arm of the 
27. Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The 
Falklands War of 1982. (London: Viking Press, 1985), 154-
155. The role of the Argentine land based aircraft will be 
discussed later. 
military that will probably not be directly involved in the 
battles. 28 
Finally, Cohen suggests that a Third World navy can 
have more effect by remaining in well-defended harbours or 
deploying itself outside of the immediate combat area, 
rather than engaging the enemy navy and possibly suffering 
heavy losses. The Argentine navy did suffer heavy losses 
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while it was at sea, as was demonstrated by the Royal Navy's 
SSN's (nuclear powered attack submarine) ease in sinking the 
cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The one element of both 
fleets that most concerned the other was the presence of the 
submarines in the conflict. The Argentine Navy was res-
tricted to operating in home waters near its bases after the 
General Belgrano was hit, and the Royal Navy was forced to 
take anti-submarine precautions to such an extent that other 
operations to retake the islands were delayed and hin-
29 dered. The British nuclear-powered submarines not only 
kept the Argentine fleet out of the way but also hindered 
the resupply or reinforcement of the Argentine forces on the 
. I d 30 J.s an s. 
Cohen argued that air power is not effective in modern 
28. Norman Friedman, "The Falklands war: Lessons 
Learned and Mislearned," Orbis 26 (Winter 1983): 913. 
29. Hubert Mointeville, Naval Warfare Today and 
Tomorrow trans. Commander P.R. Compton-Hall, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Publisher Ltd, 1983), 133. 
30. George P. Steele, Vice Admiral USN (Ret), "Warnings 
from the South Atlantic." Orbis 26 (Fall 1982): 574. 
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Third World conflicts because the air force is subject to 
heavy losses that cannot be replaced and damage that cannot 
be fixed quickly enough to stop the enemy. Cohen says that 
an air force can fight two types of campaigns. The first is 
the destruction of one or two target systems and the second 
is to gain total air superiority over the battle area. In 
the Falklands War the Argentine Air Force attempted to 
attack the British fleet and cause as much damage to the 
task force as possible. Although the Falklands are much 
closer to Argentina than they are to the nearest British 
land base they are still over four hundred miles from the 
Argentine land bases and at the extreme end of the combat 
radii of the Argentine jet fighters. 
The Argentine pilots gained the respect of their oppon-
ents though their skill and bravery but they suffered heavy 
losses due to attrition. Between 21 May and 24 May 1982 the 
Argentine Air Force lost almost forty aircraft, thirty-four 
of them fighters. During the entire campaign they lost over 
ninety aircraft and near the end of the conflict only their 
Pucaras aircraft, designed for counter-insurgency support 
were able to fly missions against the British forces on the 
. 1 d 31 1S an s. Some observers suggested that the Argentine Air 
Force, although many of its pilots were trained by the 
Israeli Air Force, was typical of a poorly trained air 
power. The pilots flew recklessly and did not appear to 
31. Lawrence Freedman, "War of the Falkland Islands," 
Foreign Affairs 60 (Fall 1982): 205-206. 
believe in the effectiveness of the enemy air-defence 
systems. The British air-defences were effective not 
through deterrence but through destruction of the Argentine 
32 planes flying well below safety level. 
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Although the claims that the Argentine Air Force fought 
bravely and was the primary instrument that kept the British 
at bay for as long as it did, the fact remains that in the 
end it was unable to stop the British. The British fleet 
was able to land troops on the islands and keep them well 
supplied until the surrender of Port Stanley on 14 June 
1982. The total air strike capability of the combined 
Argentine Air Force and Naval Air wing was between one hun-
dred and forty five and one hundred and fifty aircraft, 
including nine Canberra bombers, sixty eight Skyhawk A-4 
fighter-bombers, twenty Mirage "Nesher" fighters, forty five 
Pucara counter-insurgency aircraft, and six Super Etendard 
Naval Fighters. 33 The British naval air arm consisted of 
thirty four Sea Harriers and ninety or so helicopters of 
34 
various types. 
The dangers of combat and the distance that the Argen-
tine Air Force had to fly in its missions were not the only 
32. Friedman, 912. 
33. Stewart W.B. Menaul, "The Falklands Campaign: A War 
of Yesterday?" Strategic Review 10 (Fall 1982): 87. 
34. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "Air Power Lessons," in 
Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the 
United States, ed. Bruce W. and Peter M. Dunn, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), 38. 
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negative conditions affecting the Air Force. The equipment 
that it was using was old, and it was nearly impossible for 
the support units to maintain the aircraft at peak effic-
iency. The average Argentine aircraft was over twenty years 
old, did not operate at night and appeared to have a limited 
bad weather capability. The aircraft carried no electronic 
counter-measure equipment and were confined primarily to 
low-level gravity bomb and cannon attacks against the 
British Fleet. Although the Super Etendard aircraft could 
carry the Exocet missile they only had six or seven of the 
air-launched type in their inventory.35 
Ultimately the Argentine attack was limited by 
increased maintenance problems. The support units were able 
to keep the Skyhawks operational because they were exper-
ienced with the plane and could overcome most of the dif-
ficulties they faced. The newer Mirage and Super Etendard 
aircraft were less familiar to the ground-crews and they 
could not find ways to overcome many of the problems that 
36 they faced. The ground crews simply did not have the 
spare parts needed to keep these aircraft operating at peak 
efficiency. 
The bombing missions of the Argentine Air Force inf-
licted the most damage to the British fleet, but at an 
extreme cost to Argentine air power. The planes suffered 
35. Menaul, 87. 
36. Tilford, 39. 
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heavy losses and many of the bombs either missed their 
target or failed to detonate. The courage and bravery of 
the Argentine pilots rather than the mechanical reliability 
of their equipment, accounted for the effectiveness the 
. . 'k h d 37 Argent1ne a1r strl es a . 
The lack of success of the Argentine air war against 
the British fleet can also be attributed to the lack of 
Exocet missiles. The success of the Exocet missile against 
HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor was incomplete 
contrast to the level of success of the Skyhawk and Mirage 
bombing attacks. The Argentine Navy had six or seven of the 
air-launched version of the Exocet missile. Two of them 
were fired at HMS Sheffield. One missile hit and destroyed 
her, the other missed. Another Exocet hit the container 
ship the Atlantic Conveyor causing her to sink. At least 
two other Exocet missiles were fired at British naval ves-
sels but failed to find their targets either because of 
diversionary tactics exercised by the British ships or 
because of guidance or mechanical malfunctions. This cam-
paign was very successful for the Argentine Naval Air Wing, 
however, as it was able to sink two British ships with 
relatively inexpensive missiles and did not lose one of its 
attacking aircraft. 38 It must be remembered, however, that 
the risk to the two British aircraft carriers was minimal. 
37. Menaul, 87. 
38. Ibid. 
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HMS Sheffield was stationed well in front of the main task 
force as part of the air defence screen. It could be argued 
that given the lack of British electronic counter-measures 
equipment Sheffield accomplished its job of protecting the 
fleet, specifically the two aircraft carriers, from attack. 
Although the Argentine Air Force inflicted much more 
damage with its bombing raids, the missile attacks were more 
spectacular and efficient. The missile not only detonates 
its warhead on impact but has the added effect of spreading 
the explosion by carrying gallons of flaming liquid propel-
lant through the hole its warhead has created. With more 
missiles, aircraft, trained air crew and maintenance units 
the Argentine Air Force might have stopped the British 
39 Navy. 
Unfortunately for the Argentine Air Force it did not 
have any of these and the combined attrition due to combat 
and lack of maintenance capability limited the effectiveness 
of the Argentine air power in the war. The Argentine Air 
Force was however, able to deny the British naval air arm 
air superiority over the battle field. The British navy 
fighters were forced, by the repeated Argentine air attacks, 
to spend more time in an air defence role than in a ground 
support role. 
In the land war between Argentina and the United King-
dOffi, any technological superiority that the Royal Navy or 
39. Steele, 574. 
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the naval air wing might have held over its counter-parts in 
Argentina was not held by the British land forces. In fact 
much of the equipment that the British land units used was 
also used by the Argentine army stationed on the islands. 
In addition to this factor, the limited role for air sup-
port, terrain that limited the role of armoured vehicles, 
and the lack of urban sprawl and roadways all dictated the 
need for operations and tactics developed in the First World 
War. The British forces used artillery bombardments com-
bined with infantry assaults on vulnerable points of fort-
ified entrenchments hoping that the advantages of surprise, 
training and morale could overcome the natural advantages of 
defence. 40 
The balance of forces during the land battle has to be 
measured in both quantitative as well as qualitative terms. 
In sheer numbers the Argentine land forces held a distinct 
advantage. They stationed thirteen thousand troops on the 
islands while the British sent ten thousand Royal Marines 
and Army soldiers to retake the islands. 41 Although the 
Argentine land forces held the quantitative advantag~ the 
British clearly held the qu-alitative advantage. The British 
held superiority in leadership, training and night fighting 
capabilities. All of the British troops were professional 
soldiers including some four thousand elite Gurkha troops 
40. Freedman, "War of the Falkland Islands," 206. 
41. Goldblat and Millan, 475. 
who were recruited from outside of the United Kingdom in 
Nepal. Meanwhile the Argentine land forces were primarily 
conscripts and, aside from two battalions of marines, were 
poorly-trained and led by ineffective officers. 42 
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The general operations and tactics used in the campaign 
fall within Cohen's four characteristics of modern third 
world land warfare. The first of these was the need for a 
surprise set-piece attack with the objective of securing a 
small piece of territory. Clearly this principle was fol-
lowed during the Argentine invasion of the islands. Argen-
tina sought to launch a surprise attack, quickly over-power 
the small detachment of Royal Marines on the islands and 
capture the governor. The Argentine strategy was then to 
hold the islands against any British response. As discussed 
earlier, the Argentine government expected only a limited 
response by the British and felt that a quick decisive 
invasion would be seen as a final act. 
Due to the lack of warning (approximately thirteen 
hours) that the British troops had of the possibility of an 
Argentine invasion, they were unable to put up a concerted 
defence. Had they been given two days more warning they 
would have been better prepared. They would have attempted 
to put the landing strip out of action, mine the possible 
landing areas for the amphibious invasion force, block the 
approaches to the harbour, organize the civil defence force 
42. Ibid., 477. 
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and organize and equip the Marines into covert units that 
could have escaped into the hinterland and work as saboteurs 
and intelligence gathering units for any possible British 
43 
response. 
The second phase of the modern Third World land 
campaigns, that of battles of attrition, was witnessed only 
after the British landed its own troops on the islands. The 
war of attrition did not last very long. Cohen suggests 
that there are reasons why such wars of attrition are 
limited in time. Primarily he suggested that the two sides 
will quickly exhaust their supplies and will find it 
difficult to carryon with the military campaign. Cohen 
suggests that the outcome of this type of fighting will be 
the collapse of one government rather than the total 
occupation of one country by another. This principle did 
materialize in the Falklands campaign as the British limited 
their counter-offensive to the islands themselves. Soon 
after the fighting had stopped the Argentine military junta 
stepped down as the government of Argentina and promised 
democratic elections. 
Cohen also suggested that if a quick settlement did not 
result as a consequence of the war of attrition then uncon-
ventional weapons and tactics would be applied. Although 
the Falklands land conflict was quickly settled, the slow-
ness of the Royal Navy task force in arriving at the area 
43. "The Battle of Stanley." Sunday Times (London), 18 
April 1982, 17. 
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and then deploying the conventional land forces on the 
islands gave the British special forces opportunity to 
practice their skills. The British Army's Special Air 
Service (SAS), the Royal Marine's Special Boat Service (SBS) 
and the Gurkha Rifles played an important role in the 
campaign. They conducted numerous raids and intelligence 
gathering exercises on the islands in preparation for the 
eventual British invasion of the islands. 44 The role of the 
special forces proved to be invaluable to the British land 
campaign. As for the other forms of unconventional warfare 
there were no reports of a possible British nuclear strike 
on the islands or Argentine mainland targets or of the use 
of chemical weapons by either side. 
The special forces units played major roles in the 
retaking of South Georgia island and a raid on an Argentine 
air base at Pebble island. In the battle for South Georgia 
some one hundred SAS and SBS troops assisted the main 
landing force of 42 Commando of the Royal Marines. As for 
the raid on Pebble island the target was a grass airstrip 
where a considerable number of the Argentine Pucaras air-
craft were stationed. 45 During the raid the British SAS 
along with supporting fire from HMS Glamorgan, destroyed all 
44. Dov S. Zakheim, "The South Atlantic: Evaluating the 
Lessons" in The Regionalization of Warfare. James Brown and 
William Snyder, ed. (New York: Transaction Books, 1984), 48. 
45. Pebble island is located off of the north coast of 
East Falkland and overlooks the northern mouth of Falkland 
Sound where the British invasion force was to be deployed 
for the landings at San Carlos. 
eleven of the aircraft on the airstrip, an ammunition dump 
46 
with losses of only two slightly wounded SAS troopers. 
The Gurkha Rifles were assigned 'aggressive patrolling' 
missions and their reputation as fierce and uncivilized 
fighters reduced Argentine morale. 47 As for the Argentine 
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special forces, they were used in the initial invasion where 
they conducted a raid on Moody Barracks, the barracks of the 
Royal Marine detachment on the islands but found then empty. 
They also attempted a snatch raid on Government House with 
the intention of capturing Governor Hunt in the early phases 
of the 2 April invasion. 48 
Cohen claimed that modern Third World land forces 
preferred to entrench themselves in large urban centers 
where they could hold an advantage over a technologically or 
numerically superior enemy. Because there was no large 
urban communities on the islands this tactic was not open to 
the Argentine defenders. Although General Menendez, the 
Argentine commander of the islands, did establish his 
greatest defences around the only road into Port Stanley, it 
is unlikely that the size of Stanley could have aided the 
defenders any more than other possible garrison points. 
46. Middlebrook, 190-191. 
47. David R. Segal and Katharine Swift Gravino, "The 
Empire Strikes back: Military Professionalism in the South 
Atlantic War." in Brown and Snyder, 28. 
48. Paul Eddy and Magnus Linklater, ed. War in the 
Falklands. (London: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1982), 7-22 
passim. 
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Menendez garrisoned most of his troops though out the 
islands and intended to transport them by air to the British 
. . . t 49 ~nvas~on po~n . Although the main Argentine forces were 
deployed in and around the largest center of the Falklands, 
in the end they surrendered before a final battle for 
Stanley took place. Although the buildings might have given 
some added pro-tection for the defenders, it is unlikely 
that the Argentine forces could turn the battle into a 
second Stalingrad, a World War Two battle (that was 
instrumental in stopping the German advance into the Soviet 
Union,) that lasted for weeks, and was conducted over the 
same city blocks day after day. 
Logistics 
Theories on the Nature of Modern Logistics 
Cohen addresses the issue of logistics as that aspect 
of modern warfare that gives the Third World commanders 
their greatest problems. He suggests that not only have 
logistics been an important factor in deciding the victor of 
a campaign, but that they have also prevented many conflicts 
from even starting. Logistics can lose a battle but can 
also overcome serious inferiorities in other aspects. As 
evidence of this Cohen cites the Vietnam War and suggests 
that the persistence of the North Vietnamese forces coupled 
49. Segal and Swift, 27. 
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with the mastery of logistics demonstrated by General Giap, 
"accounted for the victory of an armed force that time and 
time again exposed itself to enormous human losses against a 
materially superior foe.,,50 
Logistical needs increase geometrically with any 
arithmetic increase in either military size or activity. 
Therefore the logistical problems snowball, and it is vital 
to all militaries to have a well-organized and trained 
logistical operation. Cohen outlines some basic problems of 
modern Third World states' logistical shortcomings: a lack 
of trained support personnel, a poorly planned logistical 
system and a socio-political system that inhibits the smooth 
running of any supply system. Discussing this last 
characteristic Cohen notes that, "traditional patterns of 
authority and responsibility have constrained effective 
[logistical] performance.,,51 
Further to the problems of supplying troops with food, 
clothing and weapons, Third World countries face a shortage 
of maintenance support. This problem is created by the fact 
that Third World states do not possess the required 
stockpiles of spare parts, requiring most spare parts to be 
acquired from foreign sources. Coupled with this is the 
fact that most Third World logistical systems cannot 
organize effective supply and maintenance networks. 
50. Cohen, 162. 
51. Ibid., 163. 
Simply put, most Third World states can provide 
pilots to fly the planes, but have difficulty 
developing adequate ground crews, stocks of spare 
parts, and maintenance facil~~ies to serve them 
during intensive operations. 
The land operations that the Third World military 
leaders favour -- pre-planned organized surprise invasions 
with limited territorial objectives followed by wars of 
attrition tend to present the smallest level of logis-
tical and maintenance problems. Unlike naval operations 
which might require the resupplying of the navy at sea, or 
air campaigns that require constant resupplying of a large 
number of spare parts as well as ammunition and fuel, land 
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forces operating in a defensive mode can stockpile immediate 
replacement needs, and supply lines can be centralized and 
short. Even with this shortening of the supply lines some 
problems will still exist as was demonstrated by the bogging 
down of the Iraqi and Chinese attacks and the Argentine 
army's problems of supplying food to its forces on the 
Falklands. The lack of roads and rail lines in these 
countries only serves to compound the logistical problems. 53 
One final note Cohen makes on the logistical aspect of 
modern Third World warfare is that for a truly effective 
logistical system for the military there needs to be a 
linkage between the military logistics and the civilian 
economy. Cohen states that the British merchant marine and 
52. Ibid., 164. 
53, Ibid., 161-164. 
the increased harmony between the Israeli civilian and 
military transportation systems aided both countries' 1982 
victories. He concludes that a strong economy helps a 
state's war machine both before and during a conflict,54 
Application to the Falklands 
At first glance it would be logical to assume that 
logistics played a much more important problem for the 
British fleet than it did for the Argentine defenders 
stationed on the Falkland Islands. In fact logistical 
problems were felt most by the Argentine forces. Although 
the British supply line was over eight thousand miles long 
and hampered by bad weather over most of the distance, they 
were able to sustain their combat forces with adequate 
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supplies. Meanwhile the Argentine forces were hampered by a 
lack of ammunition and food in the front lines and a lack of 
spare parts for their aircraft. 
Cohen raised several reasons for the lack of logistical 
success experienced by Third World states. These include a 
lack of trained support staff, a poorly organized system and 
a socio-economic system that is not conducive to the needs 
of logistics. In the Falklands War the Argentine logistical 
effort exhibited all three of these characteristics. The 
Argentine forces were able to create stock piles of 
ammunition, food and weapons on the islands but were unable 
54. Ibid., 166. 
to keep the front-line troops supplied with these 
't' 55 necess~ ~es. Although the Argentine land forces were 
deployed in a defensive perimeter around Stanley and had 
ample time to make at least some fortifications, these 
outposts had very serious supply problems. 
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Cohen suggested that the logistical problems faced by a 
land force deployed in such a limited area should not be as 
great as those suffered by the advancing force. Therefore 
there must be some other explanation for the lack of 
logistical co-operation between the garrison in Port Stanley 
which had ample supply dumps and the outposts surrounding 
the town. Norman Friedman suggested that the main problem 
was that Argentine Army officers disliked the life in the 
trenches and preferred to spend their time in the town. 
Consequently the supply problems were seldom communicated to 
the officers and no coordinated re-supply effort was estab-
56 lished between the town and the front line outposts. 
The role of the maintenance support units in the 
conflict is another area that Cohen touches on in his 
explanation of why Third World states suffer logistical 
problems. The best example of this problem is found in the 
air war over the Falklands. Although the Argentine Air 
55. Dov S. Zakheim, "The South Atlantic Conflict: 
Strategic, Military and Technological Lessons," In The 
Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and 
International Law, ed. Alberto R. ColI and Anthony Arend, 
(Boston: G. Allen and Unwin Co., 1985), 177. 
56. Friedman, 915. 
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Force had pilots who could fly the aircraft, they had 
difficulties in developing adequate ground crews, stocks, 
spare parts and maintenance facilities to continue 
operations during periods of intensive fighting. In 
contrast to this, the Royal Navy ground (or ship) crews were 
able to keep the limited number of Harriers properly 
maintained. The final result was that the Harriers were 
able to fly six sorties a day, at which point the planes 
were grounded due to pilot fatigue rather than maintenance 
57 problems. 
Cohen's final point on logistics was the linkage of the 
civilian economy with the war effort. During the Falklands 
campaign the British overcame many of their logistical 
problems by calling up civilian ships for military service. 
The Royal Navy was able to convert many of the ships 
acquired for military use by carrying out conversion plans 
that had been designed well before the conflict erupted. In 
all, fifty two merchant marine vessels were taken up from 
trade for use in the Falklands campaign. These ships 
included troop ships, hospital ships, aircraft ferries, 
floating repair facilities, mine counter-measures, mother 
ships, ammunition carriers, water carriers and other tanker 
d . 58 an cargo carr~ers. These ships played a vital role in 
57. Cohen, 164. 
58. The City of London's Salute to the Task Force: 
Official Program. (London: Harrington Kilbride & Partners 
Ltd., 1 982 ), 5 9, 64. 
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the logistical campaign. The Commander-in-Chief of the 
Fleet, Admiral Fieldhouse, summed up the contribution of the 
merchant marine by stating that, "without the ships taken up 
from trade, the operation could not have been under-
taken".59 A perfect example of the merchant marine ships' 
importance to the campaign the was chartering of two huge 
container-carrying ships, the Atlantic Conveyor and Atlantic 
Causeway. These ships solved the Royal Navy's problem of 
transporting the much needed additional helicopters and 
Harriers to the task force. The ships were loaded with 
stores below deck, and the deck was used as an air-craft 
park for the trip to the Falklands. Although the media 
reports that these ships carried twenty Harriers each were 
exaggerations, they did manage to transport six Wessex and 
four Chinook helicopters along with thirteen Harriers. 60 In 
addition to this the subsequent loss of the Atlantic 
Conveyor to an Argentine Exocet missile severely hampered 
the logistical support the fleet needed to give its ground 
troops on the islands. 61 
Logistics played a vital role in the War for the 
Falkland Islands. The success of the British in maintaining 
an effective supply line across eight thousand miles and 
59. Keith Speed, Sea Change: the Battle for the 
Falklands and the Future of Britain's Navy (London: Ashgrove 
Printers, 1982), 122. 
60. Middlebrook, 178. 
61. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the 
Falklands (London: Pan books, 1983), 227, 
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inhospitable weather proved to be instrumental in their 
eventual victory. As for Argentina, its lack of logistical 
coordination can also be called instrumental in the British 
success. The Argentine logistical problem was not caused by 
the fact that the British had imposed a blockade around the 
islands, however, but rather to poor logistical organization 
and an officer corps who did not recognize the importance of 
keeping their men properly supplied. 
Conclusion 
The War for the Falkland Islands of 1982 demonstrated 
the practical aspects of modern warfare between a Third 
World country and an ex-colonial First World country. The 
nature of warfare has changed dramatically since the age of 
colonial expansion when Third World populations had no 
effective means of opposing a colonial military power. 
Today Third World countries operate on a much smaller scale 
than their First World counterparts and can make more 
effective strategic decisions and preparations for war. 
Although Third World countries hold a limited advantage in 
the strategic aspect of modern Third World warfare, it is 
not the case in regards to operations, tactics and 
logistics. Although Third World states may hold a 
quantitative advantage in many of these areas First World 
state's advanced technology and technical expertise makes 
them a more formidable opponent than a simple comparison of 
fighting units would make it appear. 
CONCLUSION 
Two fundamental questions emerge in the aftermath of 
the Falkland Islands War of 1982. Has the war solved the 
dispute? Second, is there a possibility of a second 
Falkland Islands War? The battle for the Falklands ended on 
14 June 1982, but the conflict over the territory is still 
to be resolved. Talks continue on and off between the two 
governments, but little progress has been made. The islands 
today are heavily defended, and the British appear at least 
for the time being to be prepared to pay a heavy cost to 
defend the islands. 
The sovereignty dispute seems unlikely to be resolved 
in the near future. The Argentine claim to the islands 
appears to have been valid in 1832. They inherited the 
islands through uti possidetis from the Spanish, who between 
1774 and 1811 were the sole occupant of the Falkland 
Islands. British claims to the islands before 1832 seem 
weak, as they never held sole control of the islands. In 
1982 however, the British claim had been strengthened 
considerably. They had governed the islands for nearly one-
hundred-fifty years in a peaceful and open manner; the 
population was of British origin and was able, in no 
uncertain terms, to voice its desire to remain under British 
sovereignty. The final decision as to which date is more 
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appropriate to an international court is another matter, but 
it would seem that if the population of the islands, the 
longest continuous settlement on the islands, wishes to 
remain under British control then the islands should remain 
under British sovereignty. 
Argentina was in violation of the United Nations 
Charter when it landed ten thousand troops onto the 
Falklands on 2 April 1982, The Charter explicitly states 
that no state can use force or the threat of force except in 
self-defence, It is inconceivable that a move one hundred 
and fifty years after a foreign invasion and against a 
foreign population c0uld be justified as self-defence, In 
addition, the theory that a country can make military moves 
at will within its sovereign territory does not apply iu the 
Falklands case. As demonstrated above that this is not a 
valid argument when sovereignty over the territory in 
question is under dispute. 
The united Kingdom, on the other hand, was responding 
to an illegal use of force and in self-defence. As noted 
above, the British were responding to a military invasion of 
a territory it had governed for nearly one hundred and fifty 
years and against a population almost entirely composed of 
British citizens. 
During the diplomatic exchanges between 1960 and 1982 
the British systematically sent Argentina signals that it 
was reducing its commitment to the islands. The British 
claimed to have the wishes of the islanders at the center of 
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the debate but repeated military and quasi-military actions 
by Argentina were effective in weakening the British resolve 
to maintain its sovereignty over the islands. Although this 
was an international crisis both governments acted in a 
manner designed more for domestic consumption than for 
preserving international peace and security. 
The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was a perfect example 
of the nature of modern warfare between First and Third 
World countries. The Third World leader holds a slight 
advantage in the strategic aspects of modern warfare. This 
leader has a greater personal knowledge of the dispute and 
can reasonably predict the most probable opponents and can 
prepare the country's military to fight a local war against 
a specific enemy. The First World leader has to balance a 
global defence policy with regional needs as well as 
maintain the state's ability to fight in any localized 
conflicts that might be directed against it throughout the 
world. The First World leader does hold the advantage in 
the areas of operations, tactics and logistics though. 
First World militaries are more advanced, use combined 
forces to a greater effect and can overcome the logistical 
problems associated with conducting modern warfare. 
The results of the 1982 conflict have moved the 
possibility of a second Falkland Islands War into the 
distant future. As a result of the conflict the British 
government seems determined to increase British presence and 
investment in the islands. In December of 1982 the 
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Government approved the updated version of Lord Shackleton's 
report and announced b31 000 000 over the next six years for 
the development of the islands' economy. The islands' 
primary industry, sheep farming, has been continued and the 
possibilities of offshore and inshore fishing industries are 
being evaluated. The defence force maintained on the 
islands has been upgraded from a small detachment of Royal 
Marines to a combined air, land and sea garrison. The 
British have also constructed a new airport on Mount 
Pleasant which will enable the British to reduce its 
garrison force and allow for rapid deployment of troops 
should a threat to islands re-emerge. 
The dispute over sovereignty remains the focus of the 
debate for Argentina while the British are committed to 
ensuring the rights and wishes of the islanders are secured. 
There has been one round of talks between the two countries 
since the hostilities ended, in Berne Switzerland in 1984. 
The United Kingdom put forward a proposal for a resumption 
of bilateral relations between the two countries. They 
stressed that they felt the best method of normalizing the 
relations between the two countries was through negotiations 
on practical matters like the development of scientific, 
sporting and cultural contacts which would lead to the 
gradual upgrading of official contacts. The Argentine 
government continued with its insistence on a linkage 
between the sovereignty question and any practical 
agreements reached in the negotiations. The British refused 
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to discuss sovereignty and the talks ended in a dead-lock. 
The ultimate result of the conflict has been a 
hardening of the British negotiating position. In the years 
leading to the Argentine invasion the British negotiators 
had very little domestic support for maintaining a hard-line 
concerning the sovereignty question. Since the conflict, 
the British hard-line policy has been supported by popular 
opinion. It is very unlikely that a British government, in 
the near future, could enter into sovereignty talks with 
Argentina without suffering mass disapproval. 
The British success forced dramatic changes in 
Argentina. The Argentine government has changed as a direct 
result of the crisis. Democracy has been reestablished, and 
attention in the country has been diverted from the 
Falklands issue. There has been some limited unrest in the 
country in the past few years as supporters of the old 
military regimes protest the civilian government's trial of 
the former military junta leader's involvement in the 'Dirty 
War'. These militant uprisings have been limited and the 
country is currently undergoing its first peaceful and 
democratic change of government in over sixty years. The 
economic situation is better than it was in 1982 but by no 
means strong. The lack of progress in any attempts at the 
normalization of relations between the two countries make 
possible a return of public focus to the long-lasting 
dispute. Although it is unlikely that a democratic 
government would make a move to regain the Falklands, a 
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military coup against the Argentine civilian government 
cannot be ruled out. Should the economy continue to decline 
and the new Peronist government lose popular support the 
people may be willing to allow the military to step in once 
again. 
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